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Individuals are an integral part of international human rights. While central to our leading 
theories of human rights change and to the efforts of human rights organizations in the real 
world, empirical scholarship has not systematically investigated how individuals choose to 
become advocates. Without the mobilization of individuals, human rights institutions and 
campaigns are deprived of the energy and material that fuel their success. In this dissertation, 
I closely evaluate the reasons why individuals choose to become engaged in human rights 
campaigns, what drives them to advocacy, and what this tells us about the relationship 
between political psychology and international human rights. In Chapter 1, I consider how 
incidental emotions influence individuals’ support for child hunger relief and refugee 
assistance, finding that negative emotions like disgust tend to amplify pre-existing views. In 
Chapter 2, I evaluate the effects of the negativity bias and loss-aversion bias on support for 
child hunger relief. I find that the combination of negative imagery and gains-focused 
messaging had a significant and positive effect on individuals’ support for both personal and 
 
 
government action to help feed and house the hungry. In Chapter 3, I discuss the important 
effects that political ideology had on the relationships I observed in Chapters 1 and 2.  I 
illustrate how those on the political left and right responded in systematically different ways 
in each of the experiments, and note how these differences reveal the critical importance of 
targeted messaging with an emphasis on ideology. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of 
these dissertation findings as theoretically important and practically useful, with an emphasis 
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INTRODUCTION: Sea Slaves or Cecil the Lion? 
 On July 27th, 2015, news broke that hunters in Zimbabwe had illegally killed a 
beloved lion named “Cecil.” The story ignited an outrage of a truly global scale, with twitter 
mentions of #cecilthelion skyrocketing around the word. Two days after the news broke, 
Twitter still registered over 250,000 original tweets featuring the hashtag. Some of these 
original tweets were retweeted tens of thousands of times—one post by comedian Ricky 
Gervais was retweeted over 40,000 times. A petition calling for “Justice for Cecil” attracted 
300,000 signatures. And the social media outcry was not without consequences. Zimbabwe 
instituted a ban on big game hunting near the park where the lion was shot. The US federal 
agency tasked with wildlife protection initiated an investigation into the lion’s alleged killer. 
A number of major airlines instituted a ban on the transport of animal trophies. Amid 
intense public pressure, the American dentist who shot the lion closed his practice. 
 To be sure, the killing of “Cecil” the lion was an important moment in the animal 
conservation movement. As one commentator remarked, it signaled a moment of reflection, 
where mankind re-evaluated its relationship with the natural world it inhabits. It was, indeed, 
a seminal moment. By way of comparison, on the same day that the “Cecil the lion” killing 
broke, the New York Times published a major exposé on the contemporary human slave 
trade in the Pacific. It described the practice of capturing and enslaving men, often for many 
years, to work on fishing boats. They describe how the disobedient were killed, beaten, or 
imprisoned below deck in atrocious conditions. The sick were often simply thrown 
overboard. The story “’Sea Slaves’ The Human Misery that Feeds Pets and Livestock” was 
retweeted only 372 times, or more than 670 times less than the Lion story. It garnered only 
363 comments on the NYT website. US corporations that profit from the animal and fish 
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feed generated by the slave ships were not subject to a fraction of the intense scrutiny and 
pressure that descended on the lion-killing dentist. 
 Why, specifically, would a story about rampant slavery, torture and murder for profit 
attract so little attention? Surely it would be wrong to suggest that the average person finds 
big game hunting, or other comparable outrages, more reprehensible than slavery and 
murder. Indeed, the NYT.com user comments on the slavery story are rife with demands for 
prompt action, and seemingly genuine horror and shock.  But why was so much public 
pressure levied against the lion-killing dentist, with no analogue for the corporations making 
animal and pet food produced by modern-day slaves? Was the problem too complex? The 
situation too horrific? The solution too amorphous or difficult to identify? How does the 
political mind process information about these human rights tragedies, and what might 
explain how individuals respond, or fail to respond, when they are made aware of human 
rights abuses occurring around the globe? The objective of this dissertation is to find an 
empirical answer to this question, looking at the relationship of political psychology, action, 
and human rights abuse.  
1. The State of the Literature 
 The rise of human rights campaigns by human rights organizations (HROs) during 
the twentieth century aimed to increase the degree to which average citizens paid attention 
to human rights around the globe. These campaigns, and the very existence of organizations 
like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, depend in large part on their ability to 
attract supporters to send donations, sign petitions, tweet, write letters on behalf of prisoners 
of conscience0F1, or even participate in nonviolent protests. However, while HROs and 
                                                          
1 See Amnesty International’s “Write for Rights” Campaign: http://write.amnestyusa.org/about/ 
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human rights campaigns more broadly often rely on individuals for support, empirical 
human rights scholarship has typically focused on “top-down” processes by which states, 
institutions, laws, IGOs, and NGOs affect to human rights outcomes (see Hafner-Burton 
2012 for review, see also Cole 2005; 2009; 2011; Lebovic & Voeten 2006; Lupu & Voeten 
2011;  Hafner-Burton et al. 2011; Vreeland 2008). While most human rights scholarship has 
been focused on these higher-level issues, HROs “on the ground” have been working to 
identify the most effective ways to attract supporters to their cause—particularly because 
attracting committed supporters is often central to their chances of motivating change.  
Framing HRO campaign messages in the most persuasive way possible is central to 
attracting widespread and sustained support. 
 Furthermore, it is not only real-world HROs that prioritize citizen mobilization—our 
most prominent academic theories of human rights often do the same. Among the most 
widely cited theoretical explanations of the relationship between the global human rights 
regime and outcomes on the ground is Beth Simmons’ (2009) “Mobilizing for Human 
Rights,” which won the 2010 Book of the Year Award from the International Studies 
Association and, according to Google Scholar, has been cited over 1,400 times. In this 
landmark work, Simmons argues that human rights law and institutions create change 
primarily by empowering individuals and groups within rights-abusing states. Authoritarian 
and other rights-abusing states sign-on to human rights covenants and treaties with the 
hopes of gaining international legitimacy, with little intention of changing their domestic-
level behavior. Instead, Simmons argues, individuals and groups at the domestic level treat 
these signatures as commitments to which the government is beholden. While hoping to 
gain legitimacy themselves, rights-abusing states instead confer legitimacy to domestic 
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victims of human rights abuse when they join the plethora of treaties, covenants, and courts 
within the global human rights regime. 
 Another deeply influential, widely-cited model for how HROs affect state behavior is 
the “transnational advocacy network” (TAN), originally developed in Keck and Sikkink’s 
(1998) “Activists Beyond Borders,” which has been cited over 13,400 times according to 
Google Scholar. In brief, Keck and Sikkink built a theory that connected the success or 
failure of human rights campaigns to the interaction of international HROs with civil 
societies and civic organizations at the domestic level, which joined together to put pressure 
on states from “above” (at the international level) and “below” (at the domestic level) to 
improve their human rights practices. Using a series of in-depth case studies, they show that 
international HROs connect donors and activists in wealthy, democratic states with 
individuals and civil society groups within rights-abusing states. This network of HROs and 
activists both within and outside of the rights-abusing state applies pressure on the 
government in a way that can compel change.  
 Domestic audiences and civil society, composed of citizens, hold a central place in 
these two prominent mid-range theories of human rights, but they are largely missing in 
empirical human rights scholarship. Our theories emphasize citizen mobilization, but 
empirical scholarship has not. How might new information cause an individual to ultimately 
engage in behavior aimed at the improvement of human rights? On this issue, we know very 
little. This, in my view, presents an opportunity for us to understand why certain human 
rights campaigns, and certain human rights claims, are effective in garnering support and 
action, while many others fail. 
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 Although some empirical research has examined the role of individuals, it typically 
relied primarily on survey data to show correlations between static personality characteristics 
and human rights attitudes (Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, and Kielmann 2007, Getz 1985; 
Moghaddam and Vuksanovic 1990; McFarland and Mathews 2005). With the exception of 
occasional, recent experimental work (McEntire, Leiby, and Krain 2015), empirical human 
rights research has largely ignored how individual support and advocacy for human rights 
may shift and change in response to new information. In order to build an understanding of 
the relationship between the content of human rights campaigns and individual action, we 
should consider how “information” about human rights abuse relates to aspects of 
individuals’ political psychology.  
 Among the primary functions of many human rights organizations, both IGOs (such 
as the UN Human Rights Commission) and NGOs (such as Amnesty International) is the 
collection and dissemination of information. The purpose of this information is not simply 
historical or archival, but rather to create an impetus for action, to compel those with power, 
whether they be courts, political elites, or the mass public, to take action on behalf of a 
human rights claim. As Hafner- Burton (2012) aptly explains, “[i]n order for regimes to 
socialize or persuade people into upholding human rights, they must convey some new 
information that changes people's beliefs about the value and appropriateness of their 
actions.” Thus, a new research agenda, the beginnings of which are outlined in this 
dissertation, should focus on the dynamics of rights-related information, namely, how this 




 In this dissertation, I focus on the ways in which individuals respond to information 
about rights abuses occurring in foreign states. This approach borrows from Keck and 
Sikkink’s work, where audiences outside of the rights-abusing state are recruited and targeted 
by HROs as key stakeholders in the attempt to motivate change. The theoretical model of 
the “transnational advocacy network,” discussed above, locates these external advocates as 
critical for applying pressure from “above” the target state in conjunction with domestic 
audiences doing the same from “below” (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 
1999; Murdie and Davis 2012). For these reasons, I argue, the study of individual views on 
human rights policy within advanced democracies--and how those views may change—may 
contribute significantly to our understanding of the global human rights regime. The study 
of individual differences may provide a fruitful ground for future research on the 
relationship between human rights organizations, domestic audiences, and human rights 
outcomes on the ground. 
 1.2. Individuals and International Human Rights Organizations 
 When it comes to the normative framework of the international system, human 
rights stand alone as the most prominent source of ideas and moral justifications for actions 
that limit traditional notions of sovereignty and economic efficiency. Posner (2014) writes 
that since the 1940s, mentions of human rights in English-language books have increased 
200-fold, and that “human rights” are mentioned 100 times more than other types of rights 
(e.g. constitutional rights). While human rights language has been central to the international 
system since at least the 1970s (cf. Amnesty International’s Nobel Prize in 1977), it was the 
extraordinary growth in the number of NGOs during the 1990s which truly signaled that the 
language of human rights had been appropriated from the state-centric United Nations and 
reclaimed by international civil society (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2014). Observing this 
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trend, political scientists have since written extensively on the relationships between the 
state, domestic populations, NGOs, IGOs, and international human rights (Hafner-Burton 
2012 for review). International Relations research on international human rights has grown 
considerably over the last two decades to become an established subcategory of research in 
the field. 
 While human rights as established in the Universal Declaration of 1945 were fully 
embedded in the state-centric structure of the UN, in the 1970s groups like Amnesty 
International (AI) began to turn the focus back towards civil society. AI and other human 
rights organizations (HROs) used the language of rights not just to put pressure on states, 
but (perhaps more commonly) to call on citizens in liberal, developed countries to take an 
active role in defending those whose rights were under threat around the world. These 
HROs were engaged primarily in what historian Samuel Moyn (2010) calls “philanthropic 
humanitarianism,” where NGOs rely on and utilize citizens to write checks, file lawsuits, join 
boycotts, hold vigils, or engage in other individual actions. This is the top-down, external 
pressure to which the TAN model refers.  According to AI’s website, for example, the 
“overwhelming majority” of the funds it uses to engage in its various activities around the 
world come not from states or even foundations, but from individuals. Funds are often 
raised for targeted campaigns, where the viability of the action is contingent on the 
availability of funds. The World Food Programme, for example, raises money from 
individuals for specific, concrete actions such as drought relief in Tanzania or refugee 
assistance in Syria. AI also regularly relies on individuals for actions other than just donating. 
During its annual “Write for Rights” campaign, hundreds of thousands of individuals write 
targeted letters for the release of select political prisoners (over 3 million letters were written 
in 2014). While the specific effects of these campaigns are not always immediately clear, their 
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impact is increasingly well-established (Hafner-Burton 2008, 2014; Keck & Sikkink 1998; 
Cohen & Green 2012). For example, campaigns directed by human rights organizations have 
been found to impact the deployment of peacekeepers (Murdie and Peksen 2014). 
Boycotting campaigns have led to changes in corporate behavior and corporate regulation 
(Seidman 2007). Applying pressure from outside of the target state through coordinated 
human rights campaigns which recruit individuals from wealthy industrial democracies is at 
the core of what HROs do and how their actions lead to change. 
 While HROs often rely on individuals for support, empirical human rights 
scholarship has instead focused on higher-level questions regarding the more typical actors 
in international relations, such as states, laws, and global or regional institutions (Moore 
1998; Davenport 2007; Hafner-Burton 2008; Conrad and Moore 2010; Murdie and Peksen 
2014). Again, while this body of quantitative and qualitative research has contributed greatly 
to our understanding of the global human rights regime, it leaves out a careful examination 
of the interaction of individuals with human rights campaigns. Given that individuals play a 
key role in the practical efforts of HROs and in prominent academic theories of human 
rights change (Simmons 2009; Keck & Sikkink 1998), might variations in how HR 
campaigns motivate individuals be an important piece of the causal puzzle? More 
specifically, does the content of HR campaigns have any systematic effect on the attitudes 
and behaviors of individuals? Answering that question is the primary motivation behind this 
dissertation and the broader research agenda outlined here. 
2. Applying the Dual-process Theory of Mind to Human Rights Messaging 
 At their core, human rights campaigns are about survival. Survival can be threatened 
in obvious ways—when a regime, rebel group, or MNC is accused of killing or maiming—or 
in less obvious ways—when workers are paid below subsistence levels, when the safety of 
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workers is disregarded, when the environment is slowly made uninhabitable, when our 
autonomy is subject to state control, or when a culture or identity is erased from existence. 
Human rights seek to protect from destruction the things that make us who we are, the 
things that allow our bodies, our autonomy, and identities to survive.   
 We know that these types of political issues, those dealing with physical, sexual, and 
psychological abuses of the body, family, and group, including issues that involve disease, 
malnutrition, death, bodily harm and/or disfigurement, are deeply connected to reflexive, 
automatic processes in the brain. When the western world was exposed to the horrifying 
image of Alan Kurdi1F2, a 3-year old Syrian refugee whose corpse was found washed-up on a 
beach in Turkey, it struck a deep chord. Many news websites, such as Reuters, warned users 
about the graphic content of the photos before showing them, and Facebook was criticized 
for deleting a related photo album and the more than 130,000 “shares” of the images 
within.2F3 In cases like Alan’s, our first instinct is often to turn away in disgust, shame, or fear. 
Images like his can activate what is sometimes referred to as our “fight or flight” reflex. In 
short, human rights issues often speak to the “old” parts of our brain concerned with 
survival, avoidance of disease, decay, gore, injury, and death. 
 In this dissertation, I draw on the “dual process model” in psychology to argue that 
these reflexive, automatic responses to human rights campaign information help to explain 
why and how individuals do (or do not) change their attitudes and behaviors to become 
active supporters of rights issues. While there isn’t space here to cover the ongoing and 
multifaceted debate within cognitive psychology about the dual-process model, an 





established consensus holds that our minds perceive the world around us using both “old” 
and “new” cognitive systems. 
 The “old” part of our brains, often simply called “System 1,” harkens back to our 
days in the Pleistocene, or before that, when the world was much more dangerous and 
survival more uncertain. As Kahneman (2011, pp. 20) writes, System 1 “operates 
automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and sense of voluntary control.” System 1 
functions in the limbic portion of our brains, the “old, animal” part of our brains, designed 
to protect us from threats, keep us together in groups that keep us safe, and help us produce 
viable offspring. The limbic portion of our brain produces emotions, feelings, so-called “gut 
reactions,” and reflexes. It’s also the part of our brain that tells our lungs to breathe and our 
heart to beat—as well as our legs to run when see a predator. Its goal is to keep us alive, and 
make sure our genes get passed on. 
 System 2 thinking, by way of contrast, occurs in the neocortex, the massive region of 
the brain that makes us uniquely human. This is the part of the brain that produces speech, 
deliberative thinking, logic, and reason. Unlike System 1’s fast, effortless, and decisive 
operation, System 2 thinking is slow, requires effort, and is often indecisive. System 2 
thinking involves the deployment of “rationality,” the deliberate application of rules or other 
decision criteria over which we have ostensive control. Khaneman (2011, pp. 21) writes that 
it “allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex 
computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective 
experience of agency, choice, and concentration.” 
 While conventional wisdom assumes that System 2 is the thing most of us are using 
most of the time when we make decisions, Kahneman (2011) argues that System 1 is actually 
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doing the vast majority of the work—and “thinking”—for us. System 2’s function, he 
argues, is often to tack on a post-hoc justification for whatever it is that System 1 already 
decided, and what we already did as a result. 
 With respect to the way we think and react to human rights information, there are 
reasons to suspect that System 1 may play even more of a role than usual. While the decision 
of what dishwasher to buy, what college to attend, or what book to read next, may seem 
fairly divorced from our Pleistocene-age survival instincts, our reaction to an image of a dead 
child on the beach seems less so. The same could be true for a host of common human 
rights issues like malnutrition, untreated disease, extrajudicial killing, torture, abuse, and rape. 
System 1 likely dominates the minds of those forced to live through such abuses, but might 
it also dominate the reactions of those far away, exposed to an email, billboard, or 
commercial from Amnesty International in a safe and healthy environment? This dissertation 
tackles this question directly. 
3. Theory and Overview of Chapters 
 A full theory of the behavioral and psychological responses to human rights 
information is the ultimate goal of the research agenda sketched out here, and in other work 
I have completed with co-authors over the last several years. A small but growing cottage 
industry of political scientists and human rights scholars has begun to develop innovative 
and new approaches that, should the work continue to be embraced by the discipline 
through publications and conferences, will bring human rights scholarship closer to this 
ultimate goal. 
 In this dissertation, I hope to provide a solid foundation upon which to build this 
future work. Given the arguments I’ve outlined above, my goal in this project is to provide a 
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thorough account of the ways in which System 1 thinking and cognition contribute to 
changes in individual beliefs and intended behaviors with respect to human rights issues. In 
section 5 of this chapter, I discuss the ways in which I think this research has the potential to 
contribute not just to the academic literature, but also to practically-focused endeavors 
outside the confines of the academic journal.  
  In the sections above, I have argued that the automatic, fast, and decisive cognitive 
processes of System 1 are likely to have a significant influence on the ways in which 
individuals process and ultimately act upon human rights information. In Figure 1 below, I 
outline how I envision emotions and other known cognitive biases contribute to changes in 
individual decisions and beliefs with respect to human rights. The goal of this dissertation is 
to uncover and elaborate the ways in which System 1 thinking—illustrated by the blue boxes 
in Figure 1—contributes directly to changes in belief and intended action on human rights 
issues. The empirical chapters describe our automatic, reflexive reactions when presented 
with information designed to motivate action on behalf of a human rights claim. Figure 1 
illustrates how the research described in this dissertation, in addition to our existing 
knowledge regarding System 1 thinking, contributes to our understanding of the ways in 








 In Chapter 1, I describe some of the well-established ways in which emotions have 
been found to influence our political beliefs. In some cases, a particular stimulus or situation 
can arouse an emotional response, and that response contributes to our reaction to that 
particular stimulus/situation. In the literature, this is referred to as “integral emotion,” or 
emotion that arises from and helps to determine the response to a given situation. For 
example, being corrected by a superior at work might make a person angry, and that anger 
might influence how they respond to the correction. By contrast, “incidental emotion” refers 
to the residual effects of emotion, or the ways in which an emotional state can affect our 
reaction to unrelated situations. Using the same example, the anger a person experiences at 
being corrected at work might influence the way she treats her husband when she gets 
home—an unrelated situation. Incidental emotions help us understand the direct 
relationship between emotional states and subsequent behavior, by distancing the emotion 
from its original, potentially confounding cause.  Drawing on the work of Jennifer Lerner 
and others, I designed a survey experiment in which I engender emotions in participants 
using an established method that is wholly unrelated to human rights. Following the emotion 
elicitation procedure, I describe two human rights issues to participants and ask them to 
describe their beliefs and intended behaviors with respect to the issue. By measuring the 
incidental effect that the elicited emotional state has on the responses that participants 
provide, I am able to measure the independent effect of emotional dispositions on 
individuals’ responses to human rights information. Taken together, I find that negative 
emotions, particularly anger, disgust, and sadness, may amplify existing attitudes—whether 
supportive or not—and make intended action more likely. 
 In Chapter 2, I move on from System 1 emotions and turn to well-established 
System 1 biases. The first of these is the so-called “negativity bias,” a psychological 
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predisposition which draws individuals to negative stimuli over positive, or neutral stimuli. 
Citing public health and environmental research in this area, I argue that the use of negative 
imagery in human rights messaging is likely to be more effective than alternatives in both 
drawing the focused attention of individuals and in motivating action. However, I note the 
existence of research warning that negativity and negative imagery can lead to disengagement 
and apathy when not combined with a message explaining the immediate possibility of 
efficacious action. To identify a potential source of such a message, I turn the second System 
1 bias in this chapter: loss-aversion. Drawing on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) “prospect 
theory,” loss aversion captures the predilection individuals have to prefer the avoidance of 
losses over the attainment of gains.  Using a nationally-representative US sample, I compare 
the effects of positive and negative imagery combined with gain and loss messages on 
participants’ beliefs and intended behaviors regarding a specific human rights issue. 
Ultimately, I find strong support that negative imagery and, surprisingly, gains-focused 
messages have a significant and consistently positive influence on pro-human rights beliefs 
and intended behaviors. 
 Finally, in Chapter 3 I step back from “universal” System 1 features to discuss and 
evaluate the degree to which variations in emotions and biases between individuals can help 
to explain differences in how individuals respond to human rights information. An 
established and growing body of literature in political science finds that individuals’ political 
ideology is closely correlated with differences in the degree and intensity with which 
incidental emotions affect subsequent decisions. Similarly, individuals of different political 
ideologies are found to exhibit systematic differences in the negativity bias, and other System 
1 factors not obviously related to politics. In this chapter, I return to the experiments in 
Chapters 1 and 2, as well as other work I have co-authored in this area, to consider how 
16 
 
differences in political ideology affected the results. I find that political liberals and 
conservatives differ (unsurprisingly) in their baseline attitudes about human rights, but 
also—more interestingly—in the intensity and direction of their responses to new human 
rights information. Political ideology thus serves as a useful proxy for systematic differences 
in the ways individuals are predisposed to experience System 1 thinking. Ultimately, I find 
that political conservatives are particularly moved to express pro-human rights beliefs and 
intended behaviors when emotionally disgusted, and particularly when negative imagery and 
avoid-loss messages are used. Political liberals, by contrast, are motivated to express such 
attitudes by a wider array of stimuli, but most reliably when exposed to the personal 
narratives of suffering victims.  
4. Conclusion: Broader Purposes of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation has a practical focus. While the research conducted here addresses a 
gap in the academic understanding of how HR campaigns work, an equally-important goal is 
to develop the beginnings of a research agenda that contributes beyond the confines of 
theory. 
 The findings I outline in the three subsequent chapters improve our understanding 
of how to effectively promote human rights. Despite heavy investment in the promotion of 
human rights by states and other groups, we know very little about how to effectively 
promote engagement with human rights issues. First, learning how to use information about 
human rights to engage the public has clear economic benefits. The U.S. State Department 
FY2015 allocation for “Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance” was $2.47 billion 
alone. Billions of dollars are spent each year on human rights promotion by organizations 
such as USAID, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International. The stated purpose of 
many of these campaigns is to build “awareness” and/or to encourage people to take certain 
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actions such as donating, volunteering, or boycotting. This dissertation lays the foundation 
for an improved understanding of how these “awareness” efforts are processed, understood, 
and ultimately acted upon. Through this, we might better understand how to allocate 
resources to bring similar levels of attention to “Sea Slaves” as there were for “Cecil the 
Lion.” 
 Furthermore, understanding how to more effectively promote human rights 
necessarily benefits minority and underrepresented communities—a central focus of HROs 
the world over. Human rights abuses often, if not typically, involve minority communities, 
such as refugees or immigrants. These communities are, unsurprisingly, often the most 
regular targets of human rights abuse. Among the most difficult tasks that human rights 
promotion efforts face are convincing individuals to care for and act to defend the rights of 
people who might not look, speak, believe, or act in ways that are familiar. This dissertation 
provides tools to make that task less challenging. By uncovering how human rights 
information connects with established cognitive biases, I hope to contribute to new “best 
practices” for developing human rights information that is more difficult for individuals to 
dismiss. The benefits of learning what moves people to care about the rights of these 
underrepresented communities are clear. 
 Finally, a central motivation for this project was born from my experience as an 
educator, and my hope is that these findings have clear implications for human rights 
educators. High school social studies and history teachers, undergraduate instructors of 
international relations, history, political science, and others often face the difficult task of 
engaging students on the subject of human rights. This research could be used to develop 
curriculums and study materials designed to maximize student engagement with these topics. 
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By building a deeper understanding of the psychology behind human rights promotion, 
study materials could be developed to draw students in, capture their attention, and present 
information in such a way that genuine engagement, rather than apathy, is encouraged. This 
could help to develop students more committed to advocacy, more cognizant of rights 





CHAPTER 1: Emotions and Human Rights 
1. Introduction 
 In the introductory chapter, I discussed the difference between System 1 and System 
2 thinking. System 2 is characterized by slow, deliberate thinking, and is understood to be 
the source of “rationality,” or the careful weighing of preferences with anticipated costs and 
benefits. In this chapter, I consider that aspect of our psychology often thought to be 
reason’s antonym: emotion. While research has shown that the apparent opposition between 
reason and emotion is a false dichotomy (c.f. Mercer 2010; Nussbaum 2001), there is 
nonetheless something fundamentally involuntary about emotion. It arises whether we want 
it to or not, and it affects our decisions and behaviors without our “executive” control. 
While our emotions can be processed, acted upon, modified, and interpreted by the System 
2 aspects of our psychology, in some cases emotions themselves can have an independent, 
non-conscious effect on our decisions and behavior (Lerner, Valdesolo, & Kassam 2015; 
Small & Lerner 2008; Reus-Smit 2014). When emotions function in this way, they represent 
a System 1 process having a direct effect on behavior. These are called “incidental 
emotions.” How might incidental emotions affect individuals’ response to information and 
messaging from HROs? 
 In this chapter, I argue that the incidental emotions of anger and disgust are likely to 
have independent effects on human rights attitudes and intended behaviors. To test this 
argument, I conducted a survey experiment using an online convenience sample of about 
1,200 subjects. Subjects were randomly assigned into 5 groups, and each group was primed 
to experience either anger, disgust, sadness, happiness, or a baseline (neutral) condition. 
Following the prime, subjects were asked to begin a separate study—described as unrelated 
to the emotion task—where they were provided information about both child hunger and 
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the global refugee crisis. After reading some basic facts about these rights issues, they were 
surveyed on their intended behaviors and beliefs about them. Ultimately, disgust was found 
to have a significant influence on beliefs and intended behaviors regarding hunger, whereas 
anger was found to have a significant influence on beliefs and intended behaviors regarding 
refugees. Nonetheless, these effects were found to be heavily contingent on the political 
ideology of the participants, an effect that will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
2. Overview and Hypotheses 
 A growing body of research in moral psychology and attitudinal science finds that 
our moral values may be both born from and shaped by emotion. If the same is true for 
human rights values, this stands in contrast to dominant views in philosophy and political 
science, which treat the mass appeal of rights either as the historical consequence of power, 
the product of careful legal scholarship, or as arising from fundamentally “cerebral” or 
“rational” philosophy. I argue that human rights support, while no doubt tied to our other 
political views and beliefs, is ultimately the product of a felt response to human abuse.3F4 This 
study is unique in that it uses proven techniques to elicit emotion in a laboratory setting, 
which allows us to measure the effect of specific, distinct emotional states on levels of 
support for human rights. 
 Furthermore, this study is unique in that it measures the effect of “incidental” 
emotion on intended behaviors and beliefs regarding human rights. Incidental emotions are 
emotions that we might feel in our personal life—something we saw on the news, something 
our partner said or did, a song we heard that struck an emotional chord—but that come to 
                                                          
4 For example, in an unpublished study, Steve Arves and I found that different philosophical, legal, and 
practical arguments against the use of torture were indistinguishable from one another in terms of their 
overall effect on attitudes (Arves and Braun, 2015 working paper).  
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affect seemingly unrelated decisions and behaviors (Dasgupta, et al. 2009; Schmeichel & 
Inzlicht 2013). For example, a political science graduate student may become angry because 
of something he saw on the news about the president, and this may make his driving more 
aggressive. In these types of cases, the effect of the emotion is merely incidental. The 
emotion itself is causing changes in behavior, rather than the event that triggered it. 
Incidental emotion is contrasted with so-called “integral” emotions, which are emotions that 
are felt within the immediate context of what caused them. For example, if the same angry 
graduate student were to have written an angry letter to the President after hearing the 
upsetting newscast, the effect of the emotion on the content of the letter would be 
“integral.” In a clear causal progression, the event (newscast) caused both the emotion 
(anger) and the response (angry letter). 
 In short, studying the effects of incidental emotions allows us to measure the direct 
effect of emotion on the behavioral outcome of interest—in our case, human rights attitudes 
and behaviors. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence to suggest that certain emotions 
are likely to have a greater influence on individual human rights attitudes than others. Two 
negative emotions that have received significant attention in terms of their relationship to 
political values are disgust and anger (Lerner, et al. 2015 for a recent review). It’s my belief 
that these emotions are particularly relevant to the broad objective of this dissertation—
which is to shed light on how different types of information affect pro-human rights beliefs 
and actions. For example, one could argue that stories of suffering, such as those of victims 
of human trafficking in Myanmar, are especially effective in evoking feelings of sadness and 
anger. By contrast, ISIS videos of mass beheadings and other forms of bodily torture may be 
especially effective in evoking what has been referred to as “animal reminder disgust,” or a 
special type of disgust associated with bodily deformation. Previous research supplies us with 
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good reason to suspect that these different emotional responses may be systematically 
related to different beliefs and attitudes regarding the rights of those involved in the abuse 
and the degree to which action is required to protect them. In this chapter, I argue that the 
incidental emotions of anger and disgust are likely to have independent, positive effects on 
human rights attitudes and intended behaviors. 
 A significant body of literature now locates the “disgust” response as a key predictor 
of both moral and political values (Inbar, et al. 2012; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley 2008; Ahn, 
et al. 2014). In this literature, different variations of affective disgust have been found to be 
central for the formation of powerful moral and political attitudes. Disgust has been shown 
to influence seemingly unrelated economic decisions (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein 2004), 
attitudes on same-sex marriage (Adams, Stewart, & Blanchar 2014; Smith, et al. 2014), and 
even the environment (Feinberg & Willer 2013).  I hypothesize that human rights support, 
like other moral and political beliefs, may be systematically related to the disgust response. In 
the experiment I describe below, participants primed to feel certain emotions are exposed to 
information about both the global refugee crisis and the epidemic of global hunger. 
Following each vignette, they are presented with a series of questions querying their beliefs 
and intended behaviors. 
 I include a vignette on global hunger because I think it provides a unique test of the 
effects of the disgust response. Hunger, or at least the consequences of it, can be 
“disgusting.” Hunger can lead to disease, disfigurement of the body, death, and other 
ailments. Previous research on disgust has found that these types of consequences—those 
dealing with the flesh—can lead to a “disposal” effect (Han, Lerner, & Zeckhauser 2012). 
When primed to feel disgust, individuals show an increased willingness to dispose of things, 
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even things unrelated to the initial experience of the emotion. One possible way to “dispose” 
of child hunger, it seems, is to simply ignore it, to stop thinking about it, to do nothing. 
However, this view may be incongruous with individuals’ existing moral and political beliefs 
(System 2). In order to remain at least somewhat consistent with existing beliefs that we 
shouldn’t allow children to starve, one way to “dispose” of the information regarding 
childhood hunger is to commit to doing something—to click the link to donate in the email 
from the World Food Programme, for example. For this reason, I offer my first hypothesis: 
H1: The incidental experience of disgust will lead to more positive human rights beliefs and 
intended behaviors on the issue of global hunger, increasing the likelihood of support for 
actions to relieve hunger and willingness to act when compared to those not experiencing 
disgust. 
 On the issue of refugees, I suspect that disgust will have less of a significant impact, 
if any. The morality of accepting refugees is, at least in principle, less certain than the 
morality of saving hungry children, despite the fact that the two things are often effectively 
the same. For those primed to experience incidental disgust, the appropriate way to 
“dispose” of the information on refugees is likely to be more contingent on subjects’ 
preexisting political beliefs—a topic I turn to in Chapter 3.  On the issue of refuges, 
however, I hypothesize that anger will have a significant influence on the human rights 
beliefs and behaviors of individuals. The effect of anger on political attitudes is, to a 
somewhat lesser degree than disgust, well-established in the literature. In an exhaustive and 
original review, Banks (2014) demonstrates that emotional anger predicts racialized political 
attitudes in the United States. In one experiment, for example, Banks finds that priming 
individuals to feel anger can “activate” their racial prejudice, bringing it to fore and allowing 
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it to have a more observable, direct impact on their judgements and behaviors. Similarly, 
Small & Lerner (2008), in one of many investigations of emotions’ effect on political 
attitudes, find that incidental anger led subjects to decrease the amount of welfare offered to 
a single mother living in poverty. Other studies of anger in the international relations 
literature have found that it may explain the behavior of states in certain international crises, 
and may even independently explain the escalation of certain conflicts (see Hall 2011 for 
review).  
 I hypothesize that the emotion of anger will have a negative effect on support for 
policy and intended actions benefitting refugees. The argument for anger is 
straightforward—the literature described above reveals that anger can lead to more punitive 
political policy preferences. As Forgas (2003) and Small & Lerner (2008) argue, experiencing 
a particularly negative emotion like anger can lead one to “project” that negativity onto 
seemingly unrelated things. Small and Lerner write “negative valence associated with these 
emotions will carry over and elicit negative (i.e., mood congruent) feelings toward potential 
recipients” (151). While this effect may be small and insignificant when it comes to hungry 
children, it may be more pronounced on the issue of refugees. This leads to my second 
hypothesis: 
H2: The incidental experience of anger will lead to more punitive human rights beliefs and 
intended behaviors on the issue of refugee migration, decreasing the likelihood of support 
and willingness to act when compared to those not experiencing anger. 
3. Research Design 
 To evaluate the above hypotheses, I conducted a survey experiment using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (Mturk) platform. Mturk is a subject recruitment service which provides 
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researchers with a convenience sample of participants that is more diverse and more 
representative of the US population than other typical convenience samples, such as 
undergraduate students (Berinsky et al. 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). The 
sample of 1,240 participants was 57% female, 59% politically liberal, 73% below the age of 
44, and 76% described themselves as white/Caucasian.  
 The design of the experiment roughly correlates with the approach used by Small & 
Lerner (2008). At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are informed that they will be 
participating in two unrelated studies. The first study includes the emotion induction task, 
and the second study includes the vignettes about hunger and refugees, as well as the 
dependent variables and control variables. The purpose of describing the two studies as 
separate—when they are in fact one study—is to conceal from subjects that the emotion 
induction task is intended to affect the subsequent responses. This approach was used 
successfully by Small & Lerner (2008), and the results for this experiment do not indicate 
that subjects were aware of the relationship between the two studies. 
 After consenting to the experiment, subjects complete a written emotion induction 
task. Following Banks (2008), Small & Lerner (2008), Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein (2004), 
and others, the task asks subjects to write about a personal experience that made them feel a 
certain way, and to do so in such a way that someone reading it might feel that way. There 
are 5 variations of the writing prompt, each corresponding to 1) anger, 2) disgust, 3) sadness, 
4) happiness, or 5) a neutral condition. The neutral condition was achieved by asking 
subjects to write about what they do on a typical evening. Again following Banks (2008), 
immediately above the writing prompt, subjects also view a photograph of a human face 
making the “expression” associated with the emotion they are being asked to write about. 
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This method of emotion elicitation has been found to be particularly effective in creating the 
desired emotional state in the subject. The particular photographs of facial expressions were 
borrowed from Olszanowski, et al. (2015), who evaluated several sets of images and their 
associated features to identify an “ideal set” of expressive faces. Figure 1 displays what 
subjects in the “anger” condition viewed during the experiment.  
Figure 1: Anger Induction Task 
 
 
“Here is a picture of someone who is ANGRY. We would 
like you to describe in general things that make you feel 
like the person in the picture. Please write at least 3 to 
5 sentences, but feel free to write more. It is okay if you 
don't remember all the details, just be specific about 
what exactly it is that makes you ANGRY and what it 
feels like to be ANGRY. Please describe the events that 
make you feel the MOST ANGRY, these experiences 
could have occurred in the past or will happen in the 
future. (Examples of things you might write about 
include: being treated unfairly by someone, being 
insulted or offended, etc.)  If you can, write your 
description so that someone reading it might even feel 
ANGRY. ” 
 
 Why include sadness and happiness conditions if my hypotheses turn on the effects 
of disgust and anger? In short, these function as quasi-control conditions. By including 
sadness, I assure that, in the event that both anger and disgust have similar significant 
effects, I can rule out the possibility that any negatively-valenced emotion has an effect. 
Unlike anger and disgust, which produce automatic, System 1-type effects, sadness is a more 
reflective emotion (Small & Lerner 2008), and can lead to different sorts of more deliberate 
judgements. As such, I do not expect it to have an effect comparable to anger or disgust. 
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Similarly, happiness is included in the induction conditions to assure that, in the event that 
anger, disgust, and sadness all have significant effects, I can rule out the possibility that any 
emotion, with a positive or negative valence, or my induction task in general, is leading to 
significant effects. 
 The 5 different emotional conditions function as the independent variables in this 
study. After being randomly assigned into one of the 5 emotional conditions and completing 
the induction task, subjects were informed that Study 1 was complete, and they would now 
begin Study 2. Study 2 begins with a vignette about child hunger (or refugees—the 
presentation order was randomized), explaining basic facts about hunger around the world. 
No emotive words or images were used—only plain statistics about hunger. After reading 
the vignette, subjects respond to 5 survey questions about how they might respond to the 
information. These are the first 5 of our dependent variables: 
Q1: (Adapted from Small & Lerner (2008): “The US government spends about $28 billion 
on foreign aid to reduce poverty and hunger around the world.  Each year, Congress has the 
option to increase this amount, decrease it, or keep it about the same. What would you 
recommend to your own Congressman?” 
Maximize spending on hunger-related foreign aid 
Substantially increase spending to $35 billion, a 25% increase 
Moderately increase spending to $31 billion, a 10% increase 
Keep spending levels about the same 
Moderately decrease spending to $25 billion, a 10% decrease 
Substantially decrease spending to $21 billion, a 25% decrease 
Eliminate spending on hunger-related foreign aid 
 
The next 4 variables are answered via a 7-point agree/disagree scale: 
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Q2) “I would be willing to sign a petition calling on Congress and the United Nations to 
spend more funds providing relief for childhood hunger around the world.” 
Q3) “I would be willing to help raise funds to provide relief for childhood hunger around 
the world, whether by asking friends and family to donate or by organizing a fundraiser.” 
Q4) “Even if it meant slightly raising taxes or taking funds from other programs, I would 
support efforts by the US Government to help relieve childhood hunger around the world.” 
Q5) “I believe that every child has a fundamental human right to sufficient food and water.” 
 The same procedure is repeated, but with statistics about refugees and analogous 
questions about refugees. The first of the 5 dependent variable questions about refugees 
follows the same structure as the hunger question (Q1 above), but the increase/decrease is in 
the number of refugees admitted to the US, rather than an increase/decrease in funding for 
global hunger. Whether subjects first viewed the hunger vignette and associated questions or 
the refugee vignette and associated questions was randomized, but all subjects saw both 
vignettes and answered all 10 dependent variable questions. Finally, a series of demographic 
questions including political ideology, age, gender, income, education level, and political 
knowledge were collected. Subjects were compensated for their participation. 
4. Results 
 None of these demographic categories were statistically correlated with any of the 
experimental groups, indicating that random assignment to the 5 emotion induction 
conditions was successful. As expected, the effect of the emotional conditions was different 
for the 5 poverty DVs and the 5 refugee DVs. Within the poverty DVs, results were roughly 
consistent, and the same was true within the refugee DVs. However, a peculiar finding 
repeated itself throughout the analyses—political ideology was having an inordinately large 
effect on the coefficients for nearly all of the 10 DVs. To illustrate this, Table 1 provides an 
29 
 
overview of findings for the first “hunger” DV. Recall that this question asked subjects the 
degree to which they think spending on hunger relief should be increased or decreased, on a 
7-point scale. Lower numbers (1-3) represent increases, and higher numbers (5-7) indicate 
decreases. 
 Several analyses were performed on each of the dependent variables, and all showed 
roughly the same results. For the “hunger-funding” question below, using ordered logit, 
ANOVA/ANOVCA, or simple OLS regression all reveal that the “disgust” treatment group 
outperformed the rest, at least when ideology was not included as a control variable. Because 
OLS regression allows for easy interpretation both with and without control variables, 





Table 1: Increase/decrease hunger funding?  
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
VARIABLES Hngr Fund Hngr Fund Hngr Fund 
    
Neutral / Constant 4.802*** 5.064*** 5.959*** 
 (0.0886) (0.224) (0.231) 
Anger 0.103 0.0775 0.0783 
 (0.127) (0.129) (0.125) 
Disgust -0.236* -0.233* -0.170 
 (0.127) (0.129) (0.124) 
Sadness 0.0409 0.0135 0.0921 
 (0.128) (0.130) (0.125) 
Happiness -0.0562 -0.0367 -0.0160 
 (0.125) (0.127) (0.121) 
    
Age  -0.0371 0.00730 
  (0.0323) (0.0312) 
Income  -0.0398** -0.0140 
  (0.0189) (0.0183) 
Education  0.0310 -0.00861 
  (0.0343) (0.0330) 
Women  0.173** 0.0887 
  (0.0833) (0.0801) 
Pol. Knowledge  -0.0955 -0.119 
  (0.120) (0.116) 
Race (white)  -0.184* -0.0993 
  (0.0974) (0.0942) 
Ideology   -0.303*** 
   (0.0272) 
    
Observations 1,240 1,206 1,161 
R-squared 0.006 0.019 0.111 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Notice that, in Table 1 the disgust condition is significant in Model 1 (p=0.064) and 
in Model 2 (p=0.071), and its effects are negative. This means that individuals feeling 
disgusted were, in-fact, statistically more likely than individuals in the control condition to 
support decreases in funding for global hunger relief, not increases as I argued in hypothesis 1. 
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However, in Model 3, we see that much of this result may be driven by political ideology. In 
fact, political ideology had the largest substantive effect of any variable in Model 3. I 
investigate this result more closely in Chapter 3. 
 The remaining 4 variables in the hunger scenario all exhibited a similar pattern. 
When ideology is included as a control variable, the significance of the disgust variable 
disappears. As I discuss further in Chapter 3, the effect of disgust was pronounced in 
conservatives, leading them to support decreases in funding for child hunger, but there was 
little evidence of a disgust effect on liberals. Instead, disgust only motivated liberals to report 
higher levels of agreement with a personal intention to help organize fundraisers in their 
community to help relieve hunger. The effect of the disgust emotion on liberals, while small, 
was in the reverse direction of the effect it had on conservatives. Taken together, the results 
show that, while disgust alone had a significant effect among the emotional conditions, that 
effect was wholly contingent on subjects’ political ideology. 
 Turning next to the “refugee” scenario and five associated questions, I begin again 
with a table showing the effects of the emotional conditions on the first variable, which 
asked whether refugee admission should be increased or decreased on a 7-point scale. 
Higher numbers (5-7) indicate support for an increase in the number of refugees admitted to 
the US, while lower numbers support a decrease (1-3). Table 2 displays the results for this 
regression without controls (Model 1), with controls but without ideology (Model 2), and 




 Table 2: Increase/decrease refugee admittance?  
 (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) 
VARIABLES Rfug Fund Rfug Fund Rfug Fund 
    
Control/ Constant 4.570*** 4.374*** 6.051*** 
 (0.105) (0.262) (0.254) 
Anger 0.373** 0.328** 0.350** 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.137) 
Disgust 0.166 0.193 0.157 
 (0.152) (0.151) (0.137) 
Sadness 0.172 0.146 0.233* 
 (0.152) (0.152) (0.137) 
Happiness -0.0582 -0.0426 -0.0225 
 (0.149) (0.148) (0.133) 
    
Age  -0.124*** -0.0647* 
  (0.0378) (0.0344) 
Income  -0.0670*** -0.0103 
  (0.0222) (0.0202) 
Education  0.186*** 0.116*** 
  (0.0402) (0.0363) 
Women  0.402*** 0.312*** 
  (0.0975) (0.0881) 
Pol. Knowledge  -0.179 -0.278** 
  (0.140) (0.127) 
Race (white)  -0.0850 0.0465 
  (0.114) (0.104) 
Ideology   -0.547*** 
   (0.0299) 
    
Observations 1,240 1,206 1,161 
R-squared 0.008 0.049 0.263 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 First, notice that the effect of disgust has disappeared. Instead, anger is principally 
driving changes in subjects’ reported level of support for the admittance of refugees. In all 
three of the models in Table 2, anger has a significant and positive effect on the dependent 
variable. Positive coefficients indicate an increase in support for increasing the number of 
admitted refugees with respect to the control condition. In Models 4 and 5, only subjects in 
the anger-induction condition reported significant differences in their responses when 
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compared to those in the control group, and anger led subjects to support admitting more 
refugees to the United States. 
 Notice, however, that when controlling for ideology in Model 6, the intercept or 
control condition mean response increased from about 4.5 (Models 4 and 5), to 6.05. 
Remember, again, that this indicates greater support for adding refugees to the US. 
Furthermore, for the first time in any of the models, we see that sadness is weakly significant 
(p=0.091) and is moving subjects to be more supportive of refugee admission. The role of 
ideology in moderating the effects of emotion on the dependent variable is clearly 
substantial. More on this in Chapter 3. 
 Results for the remaining 4 variables under the “refugee” scenario yielded similar 
results, with anger having a significant positive impact on the willingness to support the 
rights of refugees and actions to protect them. Did any of the emotional categories have a 
broad impact on subjects’ responses to the 10 questions following the hunger and refugee 
scenarios? To briefly investigate this possibility, I create scale variables combining: 1) all 5 of 
the hunger questions, 2) all five of the refugee questions, and 3) all 10 of the questions. 
When the variables are combined into a single scale variable, it shows more generally how 
the emotional conditions affected subjects’ attitudes and intended behaviors regarding the 
right to protection against hunger and the right to asylum. The Cronbach’s Alpha score of 
the 10 variables was 0.93, 0.91 for the refugee scale, and 0.84 for the hunger scale, indicating 
an acceptable degree of reliability for each of the three scales.  The questions all used a 7-
point Likert-style response option, so standardization is not necessary. Each variable ranges 
from 1-7.  Table 3 reports results for the scale using the 5 hunger questions (Model 7), for 
the refugee questions (Model 8), and for all 10 of the questions (Model 9). 
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Table 3: OLS- Scale Measures 
 (Model 7) (Model 8) (Model 9) 
VARIABLES Hunger Refugee All 
    
Control/ Constant 6.414*** 6.632*** 6.524*** 
 (0.170) (0.197) (0.168) 
Anger 0.0685 0.299** 0.183* 
 (0.110) (0.128) (0.108) 
Disgust -0.0823 0.125 0.0216 
 (0.110) (0.127) (0.108) 
Sadness -0.00161 0.223* 0.111 
 (0.110) (0.128) (0.109) 
Happiness -0.0399 0.0631 0.0118 
 (0.107) (0.124) (0.105) 
    
Age -0.0745*** -0.102*** -0.0881*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0318) (0.0270) 
Income -0.0144 -0.00445 -0.00939 
 (0.0155) (0.0180) (0.0153) 
Women 0.262*** 0.332*** 0.297*** 
 (0.0704) (0.0817) (0.0694) 
Pol. Knowledge -0.163 -0.234** -0.199** 
 (0.102) (0.118) (0.100) 
Race (White) -0.127 -0.167* -0.147* 
 (0.0831) (0.0965) (0.0819) 
Ideology -0.312*** -0.547*** -0.430*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0277) (0.0235) 
    
Observations 1,161 1,161 1,161 
R-squared 0.166 0.293 0.267 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Overall, Table 3 shows that political ideology had a consistently large and significant 
negative effect on the relationship between the emotional conditions and the dependent 
variables. It also shows that gender had a comparable effect, but in the reverse direction. 
Increasing age had a consistently significant effect, but the effect itself was very small. Anger 
stands out as the emotional condition with a consistent significant effect in Models 8 and 9, 
though its lack of an effect in Model 7 indicates that, indeed, it only influenced responses to 
the questions about refugees. Further analysis in Chapter 3’s discussion of ideology will 
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reveal additional details about these data and what they tell us about how ideological 
differences and incidental emotion affect our responses to human rights information. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion  
 A goal of this dissertation is to understand how the fast, automatic associations of 
System 1 thinking affect the way we process human rights information. In this chapter, I 
investigated the ways in which the incidental emotions of anger, disgust, sadness, and 
happiness affect individuals’ views on global hunger and the international refugee crisis. I 
hypothesized that disgust would lead to increased support for child hunger victims and that 
anger would lead to decreased support for refugee rights. Ultimately, the effects of disgust 
on attitudes regarding child hunger were contingent on subjects’ political ideology, though 
no other emotion had a significant effect on subjects’ attitudes regarding child hunger. In 
this sense, the hypothesis was partially supported: disgust stood alone as the emotion with an 
effect on hunger attitudes. However, the hypothesis misdiagnosed the direction of the effect. 
Subjects induced to feel disgust were, in fact, less likely to support increasing aid allocations 
to hungry children. 
 What explains this finding? My argument in section 2 was that, given that disgust 
motivates a “discard” response, subjects would be drawn to philanthropic and rights-
respecting options as the most tenable ways to rid the mind of whatever disturbance child 
hunger had caused. Discarding the rights and needs of the hungry, I expected, would be too 
incongruous with System 2 beliefs. That said, the more punitive, less humanitarian response 
of those in the disgust condition is not without precedence in the literature. Some studies 
have shown that those more sensitive to disgust, those with a strong response to disgusting 
stimuli, are more “severe” in their moral beliefs and judgements (Chapman & Anderson, 
2014; Jones & Fitness, 2008). This is known as “disgust amplification,” or the idea that, for 
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disgust-sensitive individuals, the incidental experience of disgust amplifies the severity of 
their moral judgements. This is one possible explanation for the supported cuts in hunger 
relief among subjects induced to feel disgust. Interestingly, Fienberg & Willer (2013) found 
that, when framing things like environmental degradation in terms of “purity”—the opposite 
of disgust—political conservatives tended to become much more supportive of pro-
environmental policies. Given that, in Chapter 3, I show that the disgust effect in these data 
was almost entirely driven by conservatives, this suggests a possibility for future research. If 
hunger relief could make starving children clean and neat, might we see the reverse of the 
effect observed in this study? 
 In my second hypothesis, I argued that individuals in the anger condition would 
support more punitive actions towards refugees. While, again, the hypothesis was partially 
supported as anger had the largest and most consistently significant effect among all of the 
other emotions, the direction was the reverse of what I expected. Why would angry subjects 
be more willing to allow refugees into the US, spend more money helping them, and support 
refugee rights more broadly? The answer, I suspect, becomes clearer in Chapter 3’s 
discussion of ideology. Briefly, it was political liberals in the anger condition who displayed 
views significantly different from the control condition. Conservatives had no such reaction. 
I suspect that the experience of anger, while reading about refugee statistics, caused liberals 
to support punitive policies against the current administration. Nonetheless, that suspicion is 
only conjecture at this stage, and future work is necessary to uncover the motivations behind 
the seemingly humanitarian impulses of angry liberals. 
 Ultimately, this experiment showed that incidental emotions do have a significant 
impact on support for human rights, but that these effects are not universal. Instead, 
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emotion’s influence was deeply tied to political ideology. For HROs looking for ways to 
deploy emotional appeals in order to attract new advocates to the cause, being aware of and 
sensitive to the intended audience is a key consideration. Furthermore, in leveraging 
emotion, HROs would be wise to focus on the negative—only disgust, anger, and to a lesser 
degree, sadness had effects on human rights attitudes. In the cases of anger and sadness, 
those effects were positive. Chapter 2 explores the role of negativity in human rights 




CHAPTER 2: Human rights imagery, efficacy, and prospect theory 
1. Introduction  
 Chapter 1 focused on the specific role of implicit emotions in the formation of 
attitudes regarding human rights, or how certain emotional dispositions can lead to different, 
“automatic” reactions to issues commonly raised by human rights campaigns. Among the 
findings was that negative emotions, broadly speaking, led to greater support for rights than 
other emotions. Campaigns that fail to arouse negative emotions, on balance, are not likely 
to be as successful in attracting support as those that do. HRO approaches to campaign 
messaging can be tailored and improved when there is a clear expectation that engendering 
certain emotions increases their effectiveness. Nonetheless, HROs are unlikely to ask 
subjects to “describe a situation that made them feel disgusted” before asking for a donation 
or commitment to join a protest. In this chapter, I focus less on how System 1 features 
might affect HR attitudes in the abstract, but instead turn to those features which might 
affect the impact of concrete human rights messages on individuals. 
 Among the System 1 features that have been found to have a significant influence on 
political attitudes are the so-called “negativity bias,” and the effects that gain/loss framing 
have on political choices. The negativity bias, originally discovered in psychology research, 
finds that stimuli with a negative valence are significantly more likely to draw and hold our 
attention than positive or neutrally valenced stimuli. Within political science, this 
phenomenon has been used to explain phenomena as diverse as news consumption habits 
and the content of political speeches (Sobieraj and Berry 2011; Mutz and Reeves 2005), to 
the emphasis on external threats by political conservatives (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 
2014). Similarly, the phenomenon of loss-aversion emerged from prospect theory 
researchers in behavioral economics, but has since been widely applied in political science 
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(Levy 1996; Boettcher 2004; Jervis 1992; Stein 2017). Loss-aversion finds that individuals are 
more likely to choose the same outcome when it is framed as a potential loss versus a 
potential gain. According to this strand of research, people much prefer to avoid losing $100 
than they prefer to gain $100.  
 Each of these cognitive biases are uniquely supported by a wide and inter-
disciplinary body of research, but have yet to be considered within the realm of human rights 
messaging. Below, I discuss how the negativity bias has been used to promote things like 
environmental protection and public health, but that its effectiveness in motivating change is 
tied to the use of messaging emphasizing the possibility of efficacious action. I turn to 
prospect theory and loss-aversion as a potentially fruitful source of efficacious messages, and 
ultimately argue that the combination of negative imagery with messages emphasizing the 
avoidance of losses is a powerful way to construct human rights information. 
 To test my argument, I conducted a survey experiment on a nationally-representative 
sample of US participants, finding strong support for the effectiveness of negative imagery 
in motivating changes in intended behaviors and beliefs in support of a human rights issue. I 
find less support for the effectiveness of a loss message in motivating the same changes, but 
instead find strong support for a message emphasizing potential gains. 
 2. Overview and Hypotheses 
 2.1. The Negativity Bias 
 A central finding of the literature on political information and imagery is the so-
called “negativity bias,” which a leading psychology textbook describes as “...an outcome 
where negative information contributes more to the formation or change of an opinion than 
does positive information” (Allen and Burrell 2002, p. 83). Leading theories in evolutionary 
psychology argue that our bias for negative information stems from the rather 
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straightforward observation that individuals who were highly-attuned to dangers and threats 
in their environment were more likely to survive and produce offspring than those that were 
not. Over time, our species shows a distinct attentional preference for negative stimuli in our 
environment. 
 While this bias was initially targeted, presumably, at things like Sabre-toothed tigers, 
today it directs our attention towards the negative in the hyper-stimulating multimedia 
environment where multiple product advertisers, technological devices, and political 
organizations compete for influence over our behavior and decisions.  Psychophysiological 
research has found that, compared to positively-valenced or neutral images, we are drawn to 
more negative images, we look there longer, and our bodies even have greater physiological 
arousal in response to them (Mather, et. al. 2004; Ito, et. al. 1998; Peters, et. al. 2013, 
Hibbing, et. al. 2014a). The negativity bias may explain why conflictual, “uncivil” political 
talk shows like “The O’Reilly Factor” get huge ratings, while more traditional news programs 
on PBS get much lower ratings (Mutz and Reeves 2005). The psychological bias for 
negativity has led political parties, PACs, the television news media, and other US political 
actors to embrace negativity as a way to garner attention, get ratings, or even attract people 
to the cause (Sobieraj and Berry 2011; Mutz and Reeves 2005). 
 Negativity is further advantaged by its ability to attract and hold attention even in 
complex, multi-tasking and multi-media environments (Cooper 2013). Absent a face-to-face 
interaction (and sometimes, lamentably, even that isn’t enough), individuals encountering 
campaign information from HROs are likely to be engaged in a variety of other tasks—
checking emails at work and clicking on a message from Amnesty International or the World 
Food Programme, driving in the city and seeing a public mural or billboard from a local 
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church or community organization focused on a rights issue, browsing the internet and 
seeing banners, etc. Cooper (2013) finds not only that negatively-valenced stimuli attract 
attention in multitasking environments, but also that individuals are more likely to complete 
tasks associated with negative (vs. positive or neutral) information when distracted and 
multitasking. 
 Taken together, multiple strands of research on the negativity bias give HR 
advocates reason to recommend that HRO’s include all sorts of images, films, and personal 
testimonials which focus on the negative--on the abuse and suffering of the victims of 
human rights abuse--in their attempts to attract supporters to the cause. Negative stimuli 
lead to more arousal, and better performance on completing a required task when 
simultaneously multi-tasking. Human rights campaigns directed at engaging potential 
advocates and engendering an action such as donating, signing a petition, agreeing to join a 
protest, or simply changing one’s views (all discrete "tasks") are likely to be encountered by 
subjects who are multi-tasking. Coming across a banner advertisement or directed email 
from an HRO is almost certain to occur within a multi-media, multi-tasking environment 
where smartphone activities, social media, and other online tasks are occurring concordant 
with the encounter of the human rights message. Given this media environment, we should 
expect negatively-valenced HR stimuli to garner greater attention and greater "performance" 
in completing the associated “task.” 
H1: Negatively-valenced imagery will, cetaris paribus, have a larger positive effect on advocacy 




 2.2. Negativity, Disengagement, and Efficacy 
 However, the effects of our preference for the negative on attitudinal and behavioral 
change is less well understood. While people seem to “prefer” negative imagery, its effects 
can lead to apathy or cynicism. For example, cigarette packs that display only images of 
diseased lungs or mouth cancer have not been associated with any increased avoidance of 
smoking (Hansen and Topolinski 2010). Similarly, while individuals prefer political 
advertisements and television shows with high negativity, these types of media lead to lower 
levels of overall trust for politicians, and consumers of negative and conflictual media are 
more likely to lose faith in the political process as a whole (Mutz and Reeves 2005; 
Guggenheim, et. al. 2010; Avery 2009; Forgette and Morris 2006). That is, while individuals 
are drawn to negative representations, such representations may lead to decreased feelings of 
political efficacy. This begs the question—given the plethora of bad news regarding human 
rights--do negative human rights messages lead to disengagement? 
 A recent meta-analysis (Peters, et. al. 2013) of health-related warning materials 
provides, I think, an interesting parallel to human rights imagery. In places like Canada, 
Australia, Brazil, and many other countries, cigarette packs are required to include large, 
graphic warning labels, often depicting disease, the suffering of children and infants, and 
even death (similar, legally-required labels in the US were overturned by the Supreme Court 
in 2013). These images depict actual harm and evoke notions of fear and threat. Images of 
certain types of human rights abuse, such as torture, starvation, or genocide, seem likely to 
fit within a similar category. Indeed, I proposed studying just these types of messages in the 
two previous studies I outline above. But despite the prevalence of these anti-tobacco 
messages and cross-national evidence that they get smokers’ attention, there is little evidence 
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that such images alone lead to quitting behavior on the part of non-smokers (Peters, et. al. 
2013; Ruiter and Kok 2005). 
 Instead, Peters, et. al. (2013) find that the effect of negative imagery on behavior is 
greatest when there is a corresponding message of “self-efficacy.” They define efficacy as 
“…one's ability to negate the harm, a function of the effectiveness of a potential response in 
negating the harm (response efficacy) and one's capability to enact that response (self-
efficacy).” Without accompanying beliefs of efficacy, the authors argue that negative imagery 
quite literally backfires. It causes disengagement, dismissal of the severity of the problem, 
and apathy. This finding has been supported in other areas of social science as well, 
including in areas that are much closer to politics. For example, Feldman, et al. (2015) and 
Hart and Feldman (2014), argue that messages of efficacy play an important role in the area 
of climate change and environmental protection. They cite a body of research which shows 
that “…messages about risk issues such as climate change may draw attention to the issue if 
strong threat information is provided but that it is critical for threat information to be 
accompanied by information about the efficacy of actions that individuals can take to help 
address the issue” (2014, pp. 326).  This leads to my central hypothesis for this research 
project:  Positive human rights messages, such as the depiction of thriving children, will not 
have as strong of an effect on the attention of individuals when compared to negative 
messages, such as the depiction of starving children. However, because negative messages 
may be associated with disengagement, strong commitments for action on behalf of human 
rights will require a clear and unambiguous demonstration of efficacious action available to 
the individual. In short, I argue that an efficacious message combined with a negative image 
will drive individual opinion towards both strong support for human rights and positive 
action on behalf of human rights. 
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 2.3. Framing Efficacy: Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion 
 Peters, et al. (2013); Feldman, et al. (2015); Hart and Feldman (2014), and others 
studying the relationships between negative information, efficacy, and outcomes, generally 
describe an efficacious response as one that “negates harm.” If a message about disease and 
death caused by smoking or climate change is combined with realistic instructions on what 
the individual can do about it, the message is more likely to succeed in changing beliefs and 
behavior. Much of this literature, however, leaves out the large body of research in the 
behavioral sciences focused on identifying the ways in which variations in the framing of 
efficacious messages produces different behavioral outcomes. 
 Chief among the theories of framing and behavior is Prospect Theory (PT) first 
developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and since supported by a wide and diverse 
body of research in political science (Vis 2011; Levy 1997; 2003; Druckman 2004), and 
particularly in the field of international relations (McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005; Hafner-
Burton, et. al. 2017 for review). Prospect theory maintains that individuals make different 
decisions when the same choice is framed as a gain versus a loss. An environment-related 
message might, for example, emphasize that individuals could enjoy the benefits of a cleaner 
environment by changing certain behaviors (approach-gains scenario), or that they could 
avoid the damages of a dirtier environment by changing the same behaviors (avoid-losses 
scenario). In the prospect theory literature—while some meta-analyses have found mixed 
results (O’Keefe and Jensen 2007; 2009)—the general consensus is that individuals strongly 
prefer the avoidance of losses over the indulgence of gains (Kahneman & Tversky 1992; 
Barkley-Levenson, Leijenhorst, & Galván 2013; Yechiam 2013). 
 Loss-aversion, like the effect of incidental emotions discussed in Chapter 1, and like 
the negativity bias discussed here, is an automatic, System 1 response to external stimuli. It 
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has been associated with activation of the autonomic nervous system (Hochman & Yechiam 
2011), and it has been demonstrated in non-human animals (Silberberg 2008). Furthermore, 
like the other System 1 modes of cognition discussed in this dissertation, it has been found 
to exert a significant influence on attention (Yechiam & Hochman 2013). Scenarios and/or 
choices framed in terms of losses have been found to attract significantly more attention 
than similar scenarios that emphasize gains. 
 Above, I argue that negative imagery combined with messages emphasizing 
efficacious action is likely to be a powerful approach for attracting support for HR causes. 
Efficacious messages, however, can be framed in terms of potential losses or potential gains. 
A developed and substantial body of literature finds that individuals are both more attentive 
to losses than gains, and more likely to choose to avoid losses rather than achieve gains. For 
these two reasons, I argue that negative imagery combined with an efficacious message 
emphasizing the avoidance of losses is a uniquely effective way to attract advocates to HR 
causes within our complex, multitasking world of information. 
H2: Negative imagery combined with a message emphasizing the avoidance of losses will 
have a larger effect on advocacy and intended behaviors regarding a human rights issue than 
negative imagery combined with a message emphasizing the enjoyment of gains, and positive 
imagery emphasizing either gains or losses. 
3. Research Design 
 To evaluate the hypotheses described above, I designed and executed a survey 
experiment using the Qualtrics Omnibus (qBus) survey. The qBus survey provides 
researchers with a sample of about 1,000 participants, where key demographic variables such 
as age, income, gender, education, and political party identification are commensurate with 
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US national averages. The qBus allows researchers to purchase questions on the larger 
survey to obtain a sample that is representative of the US population. In addition to the 
benefits of obtaining a representative sample, qBus participants complete the survey online 
using either a computer or mobile device—mimicking more closely the type of conditions 
under which an individual might encounter HRO messages in the real world. 
 The experiment compares the effects of positive imagery, negative imagery, 
approach-gain messages, and avoid-loss messages, with the goal being to identify which 
combination yields the greatest probability that subjects are willing report beliefs and 
intended behaviors in support of a poverty-related human rights claim. The image 
(positive/negative) and the associated message (gain/loss) are the independent variables. The 
approach-gain message conveys how taking action to provide relief to hungry children yields 
gains, whereas the avoid-loss message conveys how taking action to provide relief avoids 
losses. The images and associated messages are provided in Figure 1 below. I chose child 
hunger as the specific human rights issue to consider because 1) it is an issue of urgent 
human rights concern; 2) emotional responses to images of children are strong (Brosch, et. 
al. 2007; Leibenluft, et. al. 2004), making this a more difficult test of the hypotheses; and 3) 
there exist straightforward ways to address child hunger, making the gain/loss frames both 
familiar and believable.  In addition to a control group (Group 5), the experiment contains 
four treatment groups outlined in the 2x2 






Positive Group 1 Group 2 




 In keeping with other studies comparing the use of certain image/narrative 
combinations on political attitudes, subjects in the Control group view an image of neckties 
with an associated message about the history of neckties (McEntire, Leiby, and Krain 2015). 
This provides a purely neutral stimuli from which to measure subjects’ baseline attitudes on 
the human rights in question. The “positive image” depicts smiling, seemingly healthy 
children, whereas the “negative image” depicts children clearly malnourished, suffering from 
extreme hunger. To maintain the internal validity of the experiment, the number of children, 




Figure 1: Experimental Stimuli  




 There are five survey questions that function as the main dependent variables in this 
study.  Each uses a 7-point Likert-scale to measure subjects willingness to 1) donate their 
survey compensation, if given the option, to a group providing relief to hungry children; 2) 
organize a fundraiser in their own community to raise funds for hunger relief; 3) sign a 
petition calling on the US and the UN to increase hunger relief; 4) support tax increases or 
program cuts in the US to increase funding for international hunger relief; 5) agree with the 
belief that all children have a fundamental right to adequate food and shelter. 
 While subjects are randomly assigned to view only one of the image/message 
combinations, all groups answer the same subsequent set of survey questions. The order of 
the dependent variable survey measures was randomized to minimize possible question-
order effects. The control variables in this study include standard demographic information 
such as age, gender, and education, and I also collect information on the respondent’s 
political ideology (liberal/left-conservative/right), and political knowledge—as each of these 
categories has been found to predict variance in human rights attitudes (Moghaddam and 
Vuksanovic 1990; McFarland and Mathews 2005, Cohrs. et al. 2007). 
4. Results 
 Survey results reveal that random assignment to each of the 5 experimental groups 
was successful. The demographic categories of age, gender, income, education, and political 
ideology were not significantly related with assignment in any of the groups. 
 Results were similar for the experiment treatments across all five of the dependent 
variables. First, I will provide a more detailed breakdown of results for the dependent 
variable which asked subjects whether they would be willing to donate their survey 
compensation, if given the option, to a group providing poverty and food relief to children. 
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Next, I’ll provide a more general overview of the rest of the dependent variables, as well as a 
scale variable which combines responses from all five of the IVs. 
 Several analyses were performed on each of the dependent variables, and all showed 
roughly the same results. For the “donate” question, using ordered logit, 
ANOVA/ANOVCA, or simple OLS regression all reveal that the treatment group which 
combined the negative image with the “approach-gain” message outperformed the rest. 
Because OLS regression allows for easy interpretation both with and without control 
variables, results using this method are reported in Tables 2 and 3 below. Table 2, Model 1, 
displays a restricted regression of our experimental groups against the “donate” variable. 
Table 2, Model 2, displays the regression with control variables of age, gender  (woman), 
race (white), income, education, political knowledge, and political ideology (conservative). 
Because race, gender, and political knowledge are categorical, each is made dichotomous for 
easy inclusion and interpretation in the model. Because the sample was 67% 
white/Caucasian, the variable capturing race is coded as white vs. nonwhite. For ease of 
interpretation, and consistency with chapters 1 and 3, political ideology is coded as 
Conservative vs. non-conservative. The political knowledge question had only one correct 






Table 2: OLS Regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES Donate? Donate? 
   
Control/Constant 4.766*** 5.626*** 
 (0.136) (0.272) 
Pos Image, Gain 0.272 0.286 
 (0.191) (0.186) 
Pos Image, Loss 0.145 0.172 
 (0.190) (0.185) 
Neg Image, Gain 0.402** 0.412** 
 (0.191) (0.187) 
Neg Image, Loss 0.279 0.319* 
 (0.193) (0.188) 
   
Age  -0.0166*** 
  (0.00388) 
Woman  0.226* 
  (0.122) 
White  -0.226 
  (0.146) 
Income  0.145*** 
  (0.0514) 
Education  -0.0175 
  (0.0436) 
Pol. Knowledge  -0.322** 
  (0.134) 
Conservative  -0.487*** 
  (0.120) 
   
Observations 1,039 1,039 
R-squared 0.005 0.066 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Looking first at Model 1, we see that the average response for individuals in the 
control group was 4.77, which approximates to the response “It is somewhat likely that I 
would donate” on the 7-point scale. Of the treatment groups, only the negative image 
combined with the approach-gain message led to a mean response that was statistically 
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different from the control. However, there are good theoretical reasons to suspect that the 
control variables included in Model 2 will have a significant influence on subjects’ response 
to the experimental treatments. 
 Turning to Model 2, the average response in the control group was 5.63, holding 
constant values for age, gender, race, income, education, political knowledge, and political 
ideology. Interestingly, in Model 2 we see that both of the negative image conditions led to 
significant differences with respect to the control. For individuals in the negative image, 
approach-gain condition, the mean response was 6.04, and for those in the negative image, 
avoid-loss condition it was 5.95. Several of the control variables also had a significant 
influence on the willingness to donate. As income increased, so did the willingness to 
donate, and women were more likely than men to report a willingness to donate. Conversely, 
as age increased, willingness to donate decreased. Those with greater political knowledge and 
political conservatives were also less likely to donate. Political conservatism had the largest 
negative effect on the willingness to donate than any other variable in the model. The same 
was true for the remainder of the models in Table 3—a result that will be explored more 
closely in Chapter 3. Neither race (White) nor education level had a significant influence on 
the dependent variable. 
 Results for the remaining 4 dependent variables revealed a similar pattern. Table 3 
displays the findings for these variables using all of the controls included in Table 1, Model 
2. Because results are similar, the use of a scale variable which combines all 5 of the DVs is 
appropriate. The Cronbach’s Alpha score of the 5 variables was 0.86, and the resultant scale 




Table 3: OLS Regression 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
VARIABLES Petition? Organize? Tax raise? Child rights? SCALE 
      
Control/Constant 6.635*** 6.514*** 6.200*** 5.967*** 6.189*** 
 (0.222) (0.225) (0.241) (0.159) (0.177) 
Pos Image, Gain 0.109 0.170 0.0528 0.0319 0.130 
 (0.152) (0.154) (0.165) (0.109) (0.121) 
Pos Image, Loss 0.0539 0.181 0.206 0.0832 0.139 
 (0.151) (0.153) (0.164) (0.108) (0.121) 
Neg Image, Gain 0.309** 0.330** 0.400** 0.295*** 0.349*** 
 (0.152) (0.155) (0.165) (0.109) (0.122) 
Neg Image, Loss 0.0439 0.276* 0.318* 0.00931 0.193 
 (0.153) (0.155) (0.166) (0.110) (0.122) 
      
Age -0.0151*** -0.0326*** -0.0225*** 0.000513 -0.0173*** 
 (0.00316) (0.00321) (0.00343) (0.00226) (0.00252) 
Woman -0.0536 -0.186* -0.209* 0.219*** -0.000804 
 (0.0991) (0.101) (0.107) (0.0709) (0.0791) 
White -0.0186 -0.0298 -0.0540 0.0883 -0.0480 
 (0.119) (0.121) (0.129) (0.0851) (0.0949) 
Income -0.0132 0.0674 -0.0398 0.0376 0.0394 
 (0.0419) (0.0425) (0.0454) (0.0300) (0.0334) 
Education 0.0195 0.0189 0.0809** -0.00670 0.0190 
 (0.0355) (0.0360) (0.0385) (0.0254) (0.0283) 
Pol. Knowledge -0.0981 -0.290*** -0.162 0.0949 -0.155* 
 (0.109) (0.111) (0.119) (0.0783) (0.0873) 
Conservative -0.888*** -0.488*** -1.023*** -0.264*** -0.630*** 
 (0.0981) (0.0995) (0.106) (0.0702) (0.0782) 
      
Observations 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 
R-squared 0.113 0.147 0.152 0.040 0.129 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Taken together, the results provide strong support for H1, that negative imagery 
would lead to attitudes more supportive of a human rights issue than positive imagery. The 
negative image, loss condition led to increased support for donating, organizing fundraisers, 
raising taxes, and was weakly significant on the Scale variable (p=0.11). The negative image, 
gain condition was statistically significant at p<0.5 or better on all 5 of the DVs and the scale 
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variable. By contrast, neither of the positive image conditions had a significant effect on the 
any of the DVs. 
 Drawing on the loss aversion literature, H2 predicted that, among the negative image 
conditions, the message emphasizing the avoidance of losses would outperform the message 
emphasizing potential gains. This hypothesis was not supported. Instead, the results showed 
the opposite. It was in fact the negative image, approach-gain message treatment that 
performed remarkably well across all 5 of the DVs, and the scale variable. Even in those 
models where the negative image, avoid-loss condition had a significant influence, the 
magnitude of the gain message difference was larger. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 Human rights organizations rely on effective communication to attract active 
supporters. Nearly all of the activities carried out by HROs require some level of financial or 
other support in order to carry out activities designed to motivate human rights changes. In 
this chapter, I considered two well-established, reflexive aspects of human psychology—the 
negativity bias and the loss aversion bias—known to affect both what captures our attention 
and what influences the choices we make. I argued that negative images combined with 
messages emphasizing the avoidance of losses would be an effective approach for attracting 
human rights advocates. 
 Taken together, one part of my argument received strong support. When compared 
to the control group, subjects who viewed an image of starving children were significantly 
more likely to report a willingness to take actions to help improve the children’s plight, and 
were more likely to agree that children had a fundamental right to food and shelter, than 
those that viewed an image of smiling, happy children. This is consistent with the literature 
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on the negativity bias, which finds that individuals are more drawn to the negative, more 
psychologically and physiologically aroused by the negative, and more able to complete 
discreet tasks when the associated stimuli is negative. The findings in this project provide yet 
another level of support for this phenomenon. The same psychological bias that draws 
people to watch cable news programs where hosts and guests argue in raised voices about 
the dangers of foreigners, can also draw people to support expanded assistance for hungry, 
“foreign” children. 
 The second aspect of my argument, that messages emphasizing losses would be 
more effective than those emphasizing gains, was not supported. Instead, it was the 
approach-gains message—combined with the negative image—that consistently 
outperformed all other treatment groups. What explains this unexpected result? 
 While the evidence for loss-aversion is substantial, the findings in this project are not 
without precedent in the literature. An emerging literature finds that loss-aversion may be 
magnitude dependent. That is, when the magnitude of losses/gains is small—either in 
absolute terms or relative to a reference magnitude—loss aversion may disappear, or even 
reverse (Harinck, et al. 2007; Mukherjee, et al. 2017). When the potential gains/losses are 
very small, Harinck, et al. (2007) found in a series of experiments that individuals may find 
an approach-gains framing more attractive than an avoid-loss one. While it may offend the 
moral sentiments of those hoping for an other-centered ethos, one could argue that the 
perceived gains/losses in this particular experiment are very small. While declining to take 
actions to help children facing hunger in the developing world may make a tremendous 
difference for a child, the loss I describe in the prompt of “having to deal with the 
knowledge that our inaction left children hungry,” making us “less happy” and “taking away 
56 
 
a chance to add meaning to our lives” may seem small.  While losing these things might not 
bother individuals, perhaps the chance to gain them gives us more motivation. 
 Another possibility is that the negative image already did all of the “work” that an 
avoid-loss message would do in the sample. Loss aversion has sometimes been described as 
“loss attention,” with the argument being that loss framing doesn’t affect the way we weigh 
choices, per se, but rather it only draws our attention and focus more effectively than gain 
framing (Yechiam 2013; Hochman & Yechiam 2011). Thus, the low stakes combined with 
the attentional draw of the negative image, may mute or otherwise “wash out” the effect of 
loss aversion. 
 Ultimately, the effects of loss aversion and prospect theory more generally deserve 
greater investigation within the context of human rights messaging. Similarly, while these 
results provide strong support for the utility of the negativity bias in crafting human rights 
messages, further research should consider other human rights issue areas. Does an image of 
a polluted lake lead to greater engagement than a pristine one with regards to environmental 
rights? What about those human rights issues where directly-relevant negative imagery may 
be hard to capture—such as the rights of workers to a fair wage, the right to free expression, 
or of due process? Comparing positive and negative written narratives, for example, may be 
more appropriate in those cases. Does leveraging the negativity bias lead only to one-off 
donations or other immediate activities, or can it improve the chances of engaging a long-
term type of advocacy? These questions, among others, suggest a fruitful avenue for future 




CHAPTER 3: How Ideological Predispositions Affect Human Rights 
Attitudes 
1. Introduction 
 In this chapter, I consider how one crucial aspect of our political psychology—
political ideology—helps to explain the ways in which individuals process, understand, and 
ultimately form policy views on human rights. In the United States, political ideology tends 
to correlate strongly with partisanship, where those leaning left associate with Democrats 
and those on the right associate with Republicans. Despite the prominence of ideology and 
partisanship in research concerning behavior and psychology within American politics, no 
studies of human rights have explicitly considered how the left-right divide affects the efforts 
of HROs to attract supporters. Does an individual’s political ideology affect how they 
respond to information about human rights abuses? Are there systematic ways in which 
different types of information about human rights are interpreted and acted upon by liberals 
and conservatives? 
 To begin to answer these questions, I bring together findings from Chapters 1 and 2 
and re-evaluate them through the lens of political ideology. In light of the findings I present 
below, I argue that while conservatives are considerably less likely than liberals to support 
certain human rights, their views may be more likely to change when abuses are portrayed 
using “negative” imagery, and when such imagery is combined with messages clearly 
elucidating benefits to both the victim and the benefactor. Importantly, however, not all 
negative information and/or imagery is created equal—conservatives appear less likely to 
adopt pro-human rights attitudes when the stimulus produces a disgust reaction. The 
negativity bias, it seems, has less of an effect on liberal attitudes regarding human rights than 
it does on conservatives, but liberals primed to experience anger or sadness displayed greater 
levels of support for rights issues. I show how these ideological differences in individuals are 
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manifested in important policy questions regarding the human rights of malnourished and 
hungry children and the rights of refugees. 
 1.1. Political Ideology and International Human Rights 
 There is ample evidence that we should expect ideology to be central to human 
rights attitudes. Like emotion, political ideology has well-established cognitive and behavioral 
consequences that affect political attitudes in systematic ways. A growing and increasingly 
sophisticated literature now finds that ideological affinity with the “right” or “left” end of 
the political spectrum is deeply embedded in the physiology, neurobiology, and possibly even 
the genes of individuals (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014b).  For example, substantial 
evidence now exists that liberals and conservatives process visual information differently, 
have different physiological reactions to political and even non-political stimuli, and 
subconsciously view the world in fundamentally different ways (Jost, et. al. 2013; Krosch, et. 
al. 2013; Jost and Amodio 2012; Oxley, et. al. 2008; Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; 
Hibbing, Smith, & Alford 2014b). Among the findings of this research is that conservatives 
are more cognizant of and disturbed by perceived threats, less trusting of outsiders, and 
more disturbed by violations of established order.  
 These ideological differences also manifest themselves in how liberals and 
conservatives respond to information and imagery. For example, Hibbing, Smith, & Alford 
(2014b) presented subjects with an array of images depicting positive (e.g. sunny beach) and 
negative (e.g. burning house) phenomena. Using eye-tracking software, they found that 
conservatives were more likely to attend to negative images, and vice versa for liberals. 
Conservatives were also more likely to describe “neutral” facial expressions as angry or 




 These “deep-seated,” System 1 differences in the processing of sensory experiences 
by liberals and conservatives have also been shown to have clear implications for more 
explicit real-world policy. Among the key findings of framing research in political psychology 
is that liberals and conservatives respond to the framing of political information in 
systematically different ways. For example, in a wide-ranging and thorough study of how 
ideology interacted with views on the environment, Feinberg and Willer (2013) found that 
the moral framing of environmental threats was interpreted in different ways by liberals and 
conservatives. They found, inter alia, that liberals were more convinced by environmental 
arguments based on harm and care, whereas conservatives were more convinced by 
arguments about environmental “purity,” the moral inverse of disgust. That is, 
environmental threats that evoked feelings of danger/threat, disgust, and/or disease were 
found to be highly convincing to conservatives.  Thus, there are good theoretical reasons to 
suspect that liberals and conservatives may respond quite differently to human rights 
information, may support very different responses to human rights abuses, and may 
conceptualize human rights in very different ways. 
 This chapter therefore seeks to identify the ways in which political ideology may 
capture variations in the effects on human rights attitudes of incidental emotions, the 
negativity bias, and loss aversion among individuals. Making this distinction is important 
because, while previous research has indicated that self-reported support for human rights is 
widespread among both liberals and conservatives (for example, a 2014 Amnesty 
International Report  surveyed over 21,000 people in 21 countries, finding that fully 82% 
supported laws against torture), beliefs about how (and if) human rights abuses should be 
confronted may differ. Identifying the ways in which ideology explains variation in System 1 
reactions to human rights messages sheds light on the origins of those differences. 
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2. Theory and Description of Studies 
 The theoretical justification for this approach draws on the aforementioned work of 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999). These authors develop a 
theory of the impact of HROs on human rights outcomes through “transnational advocacy 
networks.” TANs work by connecting HROs with domestic audiences to form a network 
that puts pressure on states to improve their human rights practices. This places pressure on 
the state from “above” (through transnational HROs) and from “below” (through domestic 
movements). As Murdie and Davis (2012) describe, “key to improvements in human rights 
performance is the combination of both domestic pressure and involvement by HROs and 
shaming on the international stage.” A key piece of this model is the relationship between 
NGOs and domestic audiences. The success of an NGO in garnering a sufficient level of 
domestic pressure is, at least in part, contingent on its ability to attract supporters to the 
cause, both supporters from outside the target state—to provide funds, legal representation, 
etc.—and within the target state. 
 As I discuss in the introductory chapter, attracting supporters often means providing 
information on human rights abuses and the norms that they violate (Murdie and Davis 
2012; Welch 2001). This information is purposeful, designed to create committed supporters 
(both in and outside of the target state) who will take action by developing and advocating 
for policy goals that respect human rights. However, the key contention of this chapter is 
that we should expect responses to this information to be contingent, likely to a large degree, 
on the political ideologies of those receiving it. This contingency has at least two core 
components. First, we should expect liberals and conservatives to begin with baseline 
differences in their beliefs and attitudes about human rights issues. Such a finding shouldn’t 
be surprising or controversial—for decades the left has been associated with support for 
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economic rights like the right to healthcare or fair wages, whereas the right has tended to 
prioritize civil rights like the right to property or equality under the law. However, these 
baseline differences remain largely unexplored or ignored in the literature relating domestic 
audiences to the outcome of human rights campaigns. Second, as a consequence of the 
psychological predispositions discussed above, we should expect liberals and conservatives 
to respond differently to the same type of information about human rights abuses. Below, I 
provide evidence that, when compared to conservatives, liberals’ experience of incidental 
disgust and anger led to increases in their levels of support for refugee rights, whereas 
conservatives’ experience of incidental disgust led to decreases in support for the rights of 
hungry children. However, conservatives expressed statistical and substantive increases in 
their support for the rights of hungry children when presented with negative imagery and an 
associated message emphasizing gains, whereas liberals did not. For the purposes of this 
chapter, I focus on select rights-related policy questions on which liberals and conservatives 
were found to have significant differences, both in baseline attitudes and in their responses 
to experimental stimuli.  
3. Liberals and Conservatives: Baseline Differences 
 As I discussed above, some existing studies have examined the ways in which certain 
characteristics of individuals, such as right-wing-authoritarianism, affect support for human 
rights. Sam McFarland, for example, has written extensively on the belief systems 
characteristic of those who tend to be supportive of human rights, and of those that are not. 
For example, he and Melissa Mathews find that those most likely to prioritize human rights 
are “…, high in principled moral reasoning, empathetic, and optimistic” whereas less 
supportive individuals are more likely to have the characteristics of “ethnocentrism and its 
root dispositions of social dominance and authoritarianism” (2005, p. 1).  
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 I suspect that McFarland and Matthews’s findings overlap considerably with the 
differences in political ideology. Indeed, what they describe as “supporters of human rights” 
versus those that are “less supportive,” correspond with the baseline differences in Chapters 
1 and 2 between liberals and conservatives. Table 1 below displays differences in mean 







 As expected, and perhaps unsurprisingly, Table 1 reveals wide differences in the 
baseline attitudes of liberals and conservatives on the issues of global hunger relief for 
children and the resettlement of refugees in the US. Given that (anti-)refugee issues were a 
priority for the Republican Trump administration during the 2016 campaign, and have 
continued to be a contentious topic in US politics through 2017 and 2018, we should be less 
surprised to see the large differences in Q6-Q7. While conservatives were much more likely 
to agree that refugees had a right to seek asylum than they were to agree with any plans to 
grant that asylum in the US, liberals still averaged much higher on that question. 
 Similarly, while global child hunger is a much less contentious issue in American 
politics, liberals and conservatives still expressed considerable disagreement on Q1-Q5. The 
response to questions Q1 (increase funding for child hunger relief) and Q3 (raise funds 
through family and friends, or organize a fundraiser in your own community for child 
hunger relief), are particularly surprising, especially given the controversial but well-
publicized finding that conservatives give more of their money away to charity.4F5 
 Given that the study in Chapter 1 was gathered from Mturk, where conservatives are 
underrepresented, younger, and less wealthy than conservatives in the broader US, perhaps 
the questions about child hunger in Chapter 2 would provide a different, more accurate 
picture? Recall that Chapter 2 utilized a sample that is more representative of the US 
population, and the average American conservative, than the Mturk sample. Nonetheless, 
Table 2 shows that similar divergence in baseline views on global child hunger occurred 
between liberals and conservatives in the Qualtrics sample, but that conservative views were 
slightly more moderate.








4. Attitudinal Change: Left and Right 
 Again, while the ideological differences on the questions about global child hunger 
would undoubtedly be surprising to some, the broader observation that liberals and 
conservatives have wide differences in their baseline views on human rights would be much 
less surprising. However, the purpose of the studies conducted in chapters 1 and 2, and the 
broader dissertation as a whole, is to investigate how human rights attitudes and behaviors 
change in response to information about human rights. More specifically, I hope to provide 
a nuanced understanding of the ways in which System 1 thinking, the type that is automatic, 
quick, and outside of our conscious control, affects the ways in which we process human 
rights information. Does the limbic portion of the brain respond differently to messages 
about child hunger or refugee rights depending on a person’s political ideology? For the 
reasons outlined in section 2 of this chapter, there are good reasons to expect that there will 
be. To begin, I turn back to the emotions experiment carried out in Chapter 1. 
 Recall that, in Chapter 1, there was a positive statistical relationship between those in 
the disgust condition and decreased support for child hunger relief. However, this 
relationship disappeared when ideology was added as a control variable to the model. In 





Table 3: OLS- Increase funding for child hunger 
relief? 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) 
VARIABLES Liberal Conservative 
   
Control/Constant 4.916*** 5.016*** 
 (0.216) (0.314) 
Anger 0.0704 0.121 
 (0.148) (0.219) 
Disgust 0.0669 -0.501** 
 (0.145) (0.223) 
Sadness 0.0718 0.138 
 (0.149) (0.218) 
Happiness 0.0472 -0.110 
 (0.142) (0.215) 
   
Age 0.00945 -0.00159 
 (0.0367) (0.0548) 
Income -0.0192 -0.00776 
 (0.0213) (0.0301) 
Women 0.0280 0.169 
 (0.0947) (0.141) 
Pol. Knowledge 0.168 -0.446** 
 (0.141) (0.199) 
Race (White) 0.0816 -0.411** 
 (0.105) (0.183) 
   
Observations 686 475 
R-squared 0.005 0.055 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The results of the separate regressions in Table 3 provide strong support for the 
increasingly well-established finding that liberals and conservatives differ in their disgust 
sensitivity and in the intensity and ultimate moral consequences of their disgust response. 
Across all of the emotion induction conditions, for both ends of the political spectrum, only 
conservatives in the disgust condition expressed a mean response that was statistically 
distinguishable from the control condition. The effect of incidental disgust on this particular 
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variable was experienced only by conservatives. In Table 4, I report results for the scale 
variable, taxes variable, and petition variable by ideology.
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Table 4: OLS- Emotions study- ideological differences on select child hunger variables 
 Petition Petition Taxes Taxes Scale Scale 
 (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7) (Model 8) 
VARIABLES Liberal Conservative Liberal Conservative Liberal Conservative 
       
Control/Constant 5.349*** 5.943*** 5.118*** 5.176*** 5.310*** 5.540*** 
 (0.268) (0.383) (0.283) (0.399) (0.186) (0.283) 
Anger 0.133 0.0715 -0.103 0.153 0.0613 0.115 
 (0.183) (0.267) (0.193) (0.279) (0.127) (0.197) 
Disgust 0.137 -0.463* 0.0860 -0.651** 0.122 -0.364* 
 (0.180) (0.271) (0.190) (0.283) (0.124) (0.200) 
Sadness 0.0687 0.0145 -0.0899 -0.221 0.0132 0.00561 
 (0.185) (0.265) (0.195) (0.277) (0.128) (0.196) 
Happiness -0.0222 -0.108 -0.105 -0.238 0.00760 -0.113 
 (0.176) (0.262) (0.186) (0.274) (0.122) (0.194) 
       
Age -0.138*** -0.152** -0.0973** -0.0610 -0.0730** -0.0816* 
 (0.0455) (0.0667) (0.0480) (0.0695) (0.0315) (0.0494) 
Income -0.0136 -0.0346 0.00299 -0.0307 -0.00588 -0.0210 
 (0.0264) (0.0367) (0.0279) (0.0382) (0.0183) (0.0271) 
Women 0.282** 0.494*** 0.0899 0.183 0.205** 0.334*** 
 (0.117) (0.171) (0.124) (0.179) (0.0813) (0.127) 
Pol. Knowledge 0.248 -0.904*** 0.161 -0.646** 0.153 -0.512*** 
 (0.174) (0.242) (0.184) (0.252) (0.121) (0.179) 
Race (white) 0.127 -0.733*** 0.0980 -0.454* 0.0695 -0.463*** 
 (0.131) (0.223) (0.138) (0.232) (0.0903) (0.165) 
       
Observations 686 475 686 474 686 475 
R-squared 0.026 0.117 0.010 0.058 0.021 0.088 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 The results in Table 4 are consistent with those in Table 3: namely, that incidental 
disgust motivated conservatives to hold more punitive views on child hunger relief than 
individuals of either ideology in any other condition.  The mean response changes for 
conservatives in the disgust condition were also substantively large. For example, in Model 2 
of Table 3 and Model 6 of Table 4, conservative mean responses decreased with respect to 
the control by -0.501 and -0.651, respectively—among the largest changes in mean response 
of any analyses within this dissertation. 
 In addition to the questions about child hunger in Chapter 1, recall that subjects 
were also presented with a scenario describing refugees. Did political ideology have any 
significant influence on the relationship between incidental emotion and the responses to the 
refugee questions? Table 5 displays the results for a selection of those five variables, as well 
as the broader scale variable. 
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Table 5: OLS- Emotions study- ideological differences on select refugee variables 
 Admit US Admit US Petition Petition Scale Scale 
 (Model 9) (Model 10) (Model 11) (Model 12) (Model 13) (Model 14) 
VARIABLES Liberal Conservative Liberal Conservative Liberal Conservative 
       
Control/Constant 4.885*** 4.499*** 4.902*** 4.709*** 5.036*** 4.687*** 
 (0.247) (0.343) (0.293) (0.395) (0.227) (0.318) 
Anger 0.372** 0.338 0.343* 0.329 0.324** 0.314 
 (0.169) (0.239) (0.200) (0.276) (0.155) (0.221) 
Disgust 0.432*** -0.250 0.429** -0.0656 0.364** -0.207 
 (0.166) (0.243) (0.196) (0.280) (0.152) (0.225) 
Sadness 0.316* 0.150 0.327 0.381 0.240 0.265 
 (0.170) (0.238) (0.202) (0.274) (0.156) (0.220) 
Happiness 0.0707 -0.230 -0.0375 0.148 0.0682 0.0146 
 (0.162) (0.235) (0.192) (0.271) (0.149) (0.218) 
       
Age -0.105** 0.00164 -0.162*** -0.133* -0.142*** -0.0596 
 (0.0420) (0.0598) (0.0497) (0.0689) (0.0385) (0.0554) 
Income -0.0321 0.0643* -0.0157 0.0272 -0.0258 0.0295 
 (0.0244) (0.0328) (0.0288) (0.0379) (0.0223) (0.0304) 
Women 0.367*** 0.156 0.521*** 0.370** 0.393*** 0.235* 
 (0.108) (0.153) (0.128) (0.177) (0.0993) (0.142) 
Pol. Knowledge 0.279* -1.011*** 0.331* -1.018*** 0.222 -0.844*** 
 (0.161) (0.217) (0.190) (0.250) (0.147) (0.201) 
Race (white) 0.228* -0.251 0.186 -0.661*** 0.0973 -0.590*** 
 (0.120) (0.199) (0.142) (0.230) (0.110) (0.185) 
       
Observations 686 475 684 475 686 475 
R-squared 0.051 0.079 0.056 0.097 0.057 0.099 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.
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 Remarkably, Table 5 displays that liberals showed a pattern of significant changes 
with respect to the control when experiencing incidental disgust, but conservatives did not. 
Additionally, liberals experiencing incidental anger showed a similar pattern in these three 
models, and sadness also had an effect in Model 9. While disgust decreased conservatives’ 
support for hunger relief in Table 4, disgust and anger for liberals increased their support for 
refugee human rights in Table 5. In short, incidental disgust caused conservatives to express 
attitudes more opposed to hunger relief, and liberals to express attitudes more supportive of 
refugee rights. The two ends of the political spectrum experienced the effects of incidental 
emotion in fundamentally different ways. 
 In Chapter 2, I moved beyond incidental emotion and looked more closely at how 
negatively-valenced human rights imagery and associated gain/loss messages affected 
individuals’ support for child hunger relief. The main findings were that negative messages 
outperformed positive messages, and that approach-gains messages were more effective than 
avoid-loss messages. However, I also noted the persistent significant effect that ideology had 
in each of the models in which it was included. Repeating the processes used to consider 
ideology in Tables 3-5 above, Table 6 displays how liberals and conservatives responded 
differently to the experimental treatments used in Chapter 2. 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: OLS- Bias study- ideological differences on select variables 
 Petition Petition Taxes Taxes Child Rights Child Rights Scale Scale 
 (Model 15) (Model 16) (Model 17) (Model 18) (Model 19) (Model 20) (Model 21) (Model 22) 
VARIABLES Liberal Conservative Liberal Conservative Liberal Conservative Liberal Conservative 
         
Constant 6.145*** 6.101*** 5.741*** 5.701*** 5.997*** 5.596*** 5.909*** 5.899*** 
 (0.268) (0.336) (0.312) (0.361) (0.205) (0.233) (0.231) (0.264) 
Pos Image, Gain 0.204 0.0180 0.230 -0.141 -0.0864 0.198 0.148 0.107 
 (0.189) (0.240) (0.221) (0.258) (0.145) (0.166) (0.163) (0.188) 
Pos Image, Loss 0.169 0.0316 0.390* 0.0403 0.0865 0.193 0.279 0.0649 
 (0.198) (0.227) (0.231) (0.244) (0.152) (0.157) (0.170) (0.178) 
Neg Image, Gain 0.239 0.401* 0.349 0.492* 0.213 0.495*** 0.311* 0.433** 
 (0.188) (0.239) (0.220) (0.257) (0.144) (0.166) (0.162) (0.188) 
Neg Image, Loss -0.129 0.217 0.315 0.232 -0.177 0.177 0.0822 0.259 
 (0.197) (0.234) (0.230) (0.252) (0.151) (0.162) (0.170) (0.184) 
         
Age -0.00827** -0.0199*** -0.0180*** -0.0259*** 0.00198 -0.00124 -0.0132*** -0.0206*** 
 (0.00397) (0.00488) (0.00463) (0.00524) (0.00304) (0.00338) (0.00342) (0.00383) 
Woman -0.208* 0.0313 -0.249* -0.291* 0.222** 0.177 -0.0577 -0.0393 
 (0.123) (0.155) (0.144) (0.167) (0.0947) (0.108) (0.106) (0.122) 
White 0.124 -0.0199 0.155 -0.127 0.334*** 0.0372 0.0716 -0.0445 
 (0.147) (0.191) (0.172) (0.205) (0.113) (0.133) (0.127) (0.150) 
Income -0.0160 -0.0111 -0.0947 0.00838 -0.0673* 0.128*** 0.0149 0.0587 
 (0.0513) (0.0647) (0.0600) (0.0695) (0.0394) (0.0448) (0.0442) (0.0508) 
Education 0.0277 0.0117 0.140*** 0.00291 0.0107 -0.0342 0.0423 -0.0277 
 (0.0417) (0.0582) (0.0486) (0.0625) (0.0320) (0.0403) (0.0359) (0.0457) 
Pol. Knowledge 0.144 -0.341** -0.139 -0.200 0.203* -0.000538 -0.104 -0.199 
 (0.137) (0.172) (0.160) (0.184) (0.105) (0.119) (0.118) (0.135) 
         
Observations 456 511 456 511 456 511 456 511 
R-squared 0.029 0.062 0.070 0.079 0.064 0.044 0.056 0.084 
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 Table 6 presents a display of 3 of the 5 variables from Chapter 2, as well as the scale 
variable capturing subjects’ underlying disposition towards the global child hunger issues. 
The table reveals that the effects of the negative image, gain message were disproportionately 
driven by the responses of the conservative respondents. While the scale variable (Model 21) 
reveals that the same negative-gain message did have a significant influence on the attitudes 
of liberals overall, the substantive effect for conservatives (Model 22) was considerably 
larger. In fact, leaving aside the scale variable, the only experimental treatment that had a 
weakly (p=0.092) significant effect on liberal attitudes was the positive image, avoid loss 
condition in Model 17. Taken together, conservatives in the negative image, gains condition 
responded much more strongly than liberals in the same condition, and much more strongly 
than conservatives or liberals in the other experimental conditions. The effects for 
conservatives in this condition were also substantively large: the negative image, gains 
coefficients in Models 16, 18, 20, and 22 are considerably larger than the coefficients on 
other variables in Table 6. 
5. Discussion 
 In this chapter, I have re-considered the findings of the experiments in Chapters 1 
and 2 in light of political ideology. I presented evidence from existing literature for 
suspecting that liberals and conservatives may respond quite differently to human rights 
messages, and I found considerable evidence that this was the case. First, I note wide 
baseline differences in the attitudes of liberals and conservatives on each of the 15 
dependent variables in the two experiments, including in the younger and more liberal Mturk 
sample and in the more representative Qualtrics sample. Next, I showed that conservatives 
in the disgust condition differed significantly from the control in the child hunger portion of 
the Chapter 1 experiment, and that no other emotional conditions for either side of the 
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ideological spectrum had a distinguishable effect. I noted that this effect was to decrease 
conservatives’ support for the human rights of starving children. 
 While the disgust condition prompted conservatives to express less supportive 
attitudes towards hunger relief, I found that the negative image, gains condition in the 
Chapter 2 experiment had the opposite effect. Among all treatment conditions in both 
experiments, only the negative image, gains condition consistently resulted in conservative 
attitudes that were more supportive of rights issues when compared to the control.  
 This latter result is consistent with the literature on conservatism and the negativity 
bias. Multiple studies have shown that conservatives experience the negativity bias more 
intensely than liberals, and that differences in conservative and liberal experiences of the 
negativity bias explain ideological variations in political attitudes (Hibbing, Smith, & Alford 
2014; Ahn, et al. 2014; Jost, et al. 2003). Based on this literature, we might expect that 
negative imagery would have a greater effect on conservatives than liberals, and that this 
would manifest in subsequent changes in mean responses to survey questions with respect to 
the control. 
 Similarly, I provided some informed conjectures in Chapter 1 regarding the reasons 
why conservatives in the disgust condition would become less supportive of child hunger 
relief. While my original hypothesis was that the discomfort of incidental disgust would lead 
to increased willingness to support the human rights of starving children, I may have 
underestimated the degree to which the experience of disgust is particularly unpleasant for 
conservatives. A brief scan of the written responses to the disgust prompt for conservatives 
reveals some genuinely disturbing content: 
“Rotten food and trash, especially maggots make me feel disgusted. The smell when 
you open up a trash can in summer, with the stale smell of rot and millions of 
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maggots crawling all over the can.” 
Similar topics often seem to appear in conservative responses to the disgust prompt: 
“I feel disgusted whenever I see anything that has to do with eye injuries. I can’t 
stand looking at any injuries that involve eyes. I feel disgusted when I’m camping or 
hiking and use one of the outhouses at the campsite or trailhead, and someone has 
decided to not use the toilet and instead do their business on the floor in front of or 
next to the toilet. I see this more often than not.” 
Liberal responses to the disgust prompt, by contrast, often seem to invoke “disgusting” ideas 
or unjust behaviors, rather than bodily injury, fluids, and contamination: 
“I feel disgusted when I see lots of little [trash] strewn accords public parks, when I 
see someone taking advantage of someone weaker than them, or trying to show how 
tough they are by preying on the weak. I also feel disgusted when people are making 
crude jokes about women.” 
Another liberal wrote: 
“what makes me disgusted is when i see someone abusing an animal it ticks me off 
to no end. animals should be loved always. theres a purpose for all and abusing them 
is disgusting and just wrong.” 
 It’s possible that conservatives’ experiences of disgust were upsetting enough that 
they were simply less able to provide “positive” answers to the child hunger questions than 
liberals or conservatives in the other experimental groups. In order to disentangle this 
possibility, future research could explore the ways in which disgust and its variations 
influence conservative views on rights issues in both incidental and integral emotional 
scenarios. 
 Moving now to the unique ways that liberals responded to the two experiments, 
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perhaps the most notable finding is that left-of-center individuals did not consistently 
respond to any of the picture/message combinations in the Chapter 2 bias experiment in a 
way that was statistically distinguishable from the control condition. A possible explanation 
for this finding is that, while liberals do exhibit an attentional preference for the negative, 
their experience of the negativity bias is less pronounced than conservatives (Hibbing, Smith, 
& Alford 2014; Ahn, et al. 2014; Jost, et al. 2003). As a result, their attitudes were not as 
deeply affected by the negative image of starving children as those of conservatives. 
 A more plausible explanation, in my view, for the lack of changes in liberal attitudes 
in the bias study and the child hunger portion of the emotions study is simply that baseline 
attitudes in the control conditions were already in the “high support” category. In the bias 
experiment, the mean response to the 5 questions for liberals in the control condition was 
5.50. With the highest possible response being 7 (“strongly agree”), there may not have been 
enough room for variation to be captured. The same issue may explain why none of the 
emotion induction conditions led to changes in liberal responses to the child hunger 
questions in the Chapter 1 emotions experiment. For those 5 questions, the mean response 
for liberals in the control condition was 5.39—subjects answering above the mean had less 
than 2 points of wiggle-room with respect to the control. 
 By way of contrast, the mean response for liberals in the control condition on the 5 
refugee questions was 5.03; and while only 1 of the 10 child hunger questions in control 
conditions of the bias and emotion experiments had mean responses below 5 for liberals, 2 
of the 5 refugee questions did. That may explain why anger and disgust were revealed to 
have consistent effects in the refugee portion of the emotions experiment—liberal attitudes 
were finally skeptical enough at baseline to have room to move upwards. 
 The same phenomenon may explain why there were no observed effects of the 
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emotion conditions for conservatives on the refugee questions—though to a somewhat 
lesser degree. The mean response for conservatives on the refugee questions was 3.58, the 
lowest/least-supportive average by a substantial margin when compared to mean 
conservative attitudes on the 10 child hunger questions. Conservative responses on the 
refugee questions thus may have already approached their lower-bound in the control 
condition. 
 In the final analysis, the emotions experiment shows that rather than changing the 
direction of support for human rights issues, incidental emotions of disgust (and, for liberals, 
anger), led both conservatives and liberals to express more extreme versions of their 
preexisting biases. Liberals, already predisposed to support refugee issues—but with some 
room to grow—translated their incidental anger and disgust into more intense levels of 
support. Conservatives, by contrast, already somewhat doubtful of the degree to which they, 
or the United States, should be expected to help starving children in far-away places, 
translated their disgust into more intensely stringent views. The moral “amplification” 
properties of disgust are supported by these findings. 
 If there is a hopeful spot in these findings for HROs seeking to create information 
that changes, rather than simply reinforces, existing views, the results for political 
conservatives in in the bias experiment is where they would find it. Political conservatives 
exposed to negative imagery, with an associated message emphasizing clear rewards for both 
the victims and their benefactors, consistently and substantially reported a greater willingness 
to contribute to the cause. Across all of the empirical models in this paper, the largest 
positive effect was the one that this message combination had on conservatives’ support for 
hungry, foreign children. It is my sincere privilege to take that hopeful note away from this 




 In the introduction to this dissertation, I set out to describe a substantial gap in the 
academic literature on international human rights. Existing empirical work on human rights, 
such as Fariss (2014), has tended to focus on the aggregate effects of human rights 
institutions. These “top-down” analyses have considered state-level or regional changes as a 
result of the human rights regime, and significant effects have been difficult to isolate. 
Despite the prevalence of these top-down analyses, our central theories of how human rights 
lead to change include a key role for domestic audiences and individuals (Simmons 2009; 
Keck & Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, HROs operating in the field devote a considerable 
amount of their efforts and resources to recruiting advocates from advanced, wealthy 
democracies like the United States. These advocates supply HROs with funds and foot 
soldiers to apply pressure on rights abusing states from “above,” in conjunction with 
domestic individuals and groups applying pressure from within the state, from “below.” In 
short, real-world HROs and prominent academic theories emphasize citizen mobilization, 
but empirical scholarship largely has not. 
 I argued that understanding how variations in the content of campaigns affect 
individual willingness to act may provide a missing piece of the causal puzzle. Specifically, I 
argued that a promising place to begin this type of research program is to consider how 
human rights information is processed by the fast, automatic cognitive processes associated 
with System 1. Because human rights issues so often deal with matters of survival, pain, 
suffering, and death--the old, animalistic part of our brains is likely to play an important role 
in how we respond to this information. Existing literature within political psychology 
outlines certain well-established System 1 biases that seemed likely to have a particularly 
significant impact on individuals’ reaction to human rights issues. Thus, I argued that a 
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thorough investigation of the effects of System 1 biases on individuals’ interpretation of HR 
information is appropriate for both academic and practical purposes. The three empirical 
chapters of the dissertation set out to identify the ways in which incidental emotion, the 
negativity bias and loss aversion, and non-conscious ideological predispositions affected the 
responses of individuals to human rights information. 
 In Chapter 1, I set out to identify how incidental emotions affect individuals’ 
response to HR information. While I hypothesized that disgust would increase support for 
rights and anger would decrease it, I found the opposite. While incidental emotion had a 
consistent effect, it was largely contingent on subjects’ political ideology. Political liberals 
who were angry or disgusted exhibited increased support for the rights of refugees, while 
political conservatives who were disgusted exhibited decreased support for child hunger 
relief. Ultimately, I found that incidental emotions may amplify existing attitudes about 
human rights, rather than change them. 
 In Chapter 2, I considered how the negativity bias and the loss-aversion bias may 
influence the ways in which we interpret human rights information. I argued that negative 
human rights stimuli was likely to increase subjects’ attention, but may lead to 
disengagement. I hypothesized that combining negative imagery with an avoid-loss frame 
may offset this disengagement and increase support for human rights and intentions to act. 
Using an experiment to compare the effects of different frames, I found that a negative 
image combined with a message emphasizing potential gains—not the avoidance of losses--
significantly outperformed the rest. Again, however, this result was highly sensitive to the 
political ideology of participants, a result I investigated further in chapter 3. 
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 In Chapter 3, I outlined a growing but now well-established body of literature 
finding that political ideology is a reflection of, or proxy for, certain deep-seated variations in 
System 1 biases. Among the findings of this literature is that ideological conservatives are 
more sensitive to negativity and disgust than liberals. I argued that the results of the 
experiments I described in Chapters 1 and 2 provide support for this, indicating that 
variations in System 1 biases as reflected in political ideology could be a fruitful ground for 
understanding variations in how individuals respond to human rights information. More 
importantly, I show that despite wide baseline differences in their views on human rights 
issues, both liberals and conservatives became more supportive of rights issues—and 
showed a greater willingness to act—in response to certain types of messaging. Specifically, 
liberals became more supportive of refugee rights when primed to experience negative 
emotions, especially incidental anger and disgust. Conservatives became more supportive of 
global hunger relief when exposed to negative imagery with associated messaging focused on 
gains. Ultimately, Chapter 3 illustrates that the effects of System 1 biases on our responses to 
human rights information are not universal, but they do vary in systematic ways that align 
with individuals’ political ideology. 
 What are the implications of the empirical findings outlined in Chapters 1-3? From a 
purely academic perspective, these results show that individuals’ decisions to support (or 
ignore) human rights campaigns is likely affected in systematic ways by intrinsic cognitive 
biases. While certain “accidental” factors like timing, political relevance, location in the news 
cycle, and other factors related to pure chance almost certainly explain variations in why and 
how certain campaigns gain traction while others do not, the findings outlined above show 
that bias has systematic, predictable effects in how HR campaign information leads to 
changes in belief and intended action. Incorporating what we know about bias into broader 
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theories about the effects of human rights campaigns on human rights outcomes is likely to 
create not just a more descriptively accurate picture, but one that helps us understand why 
some campaigns succeed in attracting supporters while others do not. More broadly, this 
dissertation provides a test case, or proving ground, for the utility of existing literature in 
political psychology and other behavioral sciences for providing many new, unexplored, and 
potentially fruitful approaches to studying the relationship between the content of human 
rights campaigns, the psychology of individuals, and the probability of individual action. 
 However, as I argued in the introductory chapter, the focus of the research described 
in this dissertation is fundamentally practical.  What are the implications for Human Rights 
Organizations operating in the field, right now? Of course, we can’t draw any firm 
conclusions based on a small handful of studies alone. The prospects for future 
investigations are, as I describe in the preceding paragraph, both straightforward and likely 
to be fruitful. Still, Chapter 1 provides preliminary evidence that negative emotions can be an 
effective tool in amplifying existing attitudes and making action more likely. Political liberals, 
already disposed to support the rights of refugees, exhibited significantly more willingness to 
take action on these beliefs when experiencing incidental anger or disgust. When targeting 
liberals—now a matter of course due to available data from social media—a promising 
strategy seems to be the use of emotionally-charged stimuli. 
 Furthermore, HROs would be wise to consider the use of negative imagery more 
widely. An anecdotal review of the emails I receive from HROs include lots of smiling, well-
fed children and happy mothers with associated calls to provide monetary assistance to 
prevent their starvation. These messages may be less likely to create disengagement than 
images of starving mothers and children, but also less likely to capture attention. Chapter 2 
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shows that combining negative imagery with gains-focused messaging may be significantly 
more productive than any combination of messaging with positive imagery. Examining this 
finding on new samples of individuals and on different human rights topics will further 
reveal the important implications of the negativity bias and loss aversion bias on individuals’ 
willingness to take action in response to human rights campaign materials. When the 
availability of monetary resources are the only thing standing between humanitarian agencies 
and the survival of families, the implications of this research are, to say the least, potentially 
significant. 
 Finally, Chapter 3 provides an important caveat to these practical implications. 
Keeping the intended audience in mind is critical. Political ideology, an important and 
widely-investigated proxy for apparent variations in deep-seated cognitive biases, had a 
decisive impact on the effects of different types of information. Again, social media and 
other forms of obtainable browsing history make targeted messaging a matter of routine. 
Tailoring different messages for liberals and conservatives is absolutely vital to any human 
rights campaign interested in building a diverse coalition of advocates immune to the effects 
of ideology and political partisanship. And online marketing isn’t the only place we might 
expect HROs to make this kind of distinction—a message asking a church in Mississippi to 
provide host families or funds for refugees from the Congo should be crafted very 
differently than the same message targeted to college undergraduates at NYU. When crafting 
a human rights campaign, the audience of each and every message should be considered and 
the message tailored respectively. 
 As a final note, I’d like to anticipate and respond to a common critique of this 
research agenda. When presenting research like I’ve outlined in this dissertation, on more 
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than one occasion I’ve received comments that it seems under-handed, manipulative, or 
disrespectful of the clear-eyed processes of democratic deliberation which are, themselves, 
part of the human rights corpus. Shouldn’t we seek to provide thoughtful, rational reasons to 
support human rights, instead of leveraging cognitive biases and predispositions that may or 
may not have any rational justification? This argument, while certainly understandable and a 
product of good faith, simply ignores the stakes involved. Given the stakes at hand—literally 
the lives of the world’s most desperate and vulnerable people—it would be a grievous 
mistake to ignore what we know about persuasion in building a coalition to come to their 
aid. Furthermore, simply having a conversation often involves our own use of “folk” 
persuasiveness—talking to my partner about where to eat might involve suggestions that she 
has liked similar food before, or that people she trusts reported liking the place, or that the 
owner happens to be a supporter of our favorite political candidate. Why should human 
rights advocates consciously force themselves to employ only folk-level persuasive 
techniques? I argue that it would be an unjustifiable disservice to the victims of human rights 
abuse to refuse the use of social science in making arguments in favor of their protection. 
This is doubly true when the opponents of human rights protections, including authoritarian 
states like Russia or corporate conglomerates like Exxon-Mobil or the Koch Foundation, are 
well-funded, strong, mobilized, and employing every advertising tactic available to sustain (or 
reverse) the status quo. Refusing the use of scientific knowledge about persuasion is nothing 
less than a self-imposed handicap against these regressive forces, and one that treats the 




Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics 
Emotions Experiment 
 Full Sample Control Anger Disgust Sad Happy 
N 1,039 258 244 242 236 260 
Age: under 44* 73% 72% 74% 71% 74% 75% 
Income: under 75,000 67% 63% 69% 68% 73% 64% 
Women 57% 57% 61% 55% 61% 52% 
Education: some 
college, no degree 42% 38% 44% 44% 47% 40% 
White/Caucasian 76% 75% 74% 77% 76% 77% 
Knowledge: Reps more 
conservative than dems 86% 87% 84% 85% 84% 88% 
Conservatives 41% 39% 42% 39% 44% 41% 
 
Bias Experiment 
 Full Sample Control Pos, Gain Pos, Loss Neg, Gain Neg, Loss 
N 1,240 205 209 214 209 202 
Age: mean, sd* 44, 16.5 43, 15.8 45, 16.4 43, 16.5 44, 17.1 44, 17.1 
Income: under 75,000 58% 60% 56% 63% 56% 58% 
Women 51% 55% 53% 51% 45% 52% 
Education: some 
college, no degree 46% 45% 44% 48% 49% 47% 
White/Caucasian 68% 66% 69% 70% 66% 66% 
Knowledge: Reps more 
conservative than dems 67% 65% 67% 62% 72% 71% 
Conservatives 53% 55% 48% 58% 48% 55% 
*Age was recorded as continuous in the Bias Experiment, but ordinal in the Emotions 
Experiment 
 
Bias Experiment: by Ideology 
 Full Sample Control Pos, Gain Pos, Loss Neg, Gain Neg, loss 
 Libs Cons Libs Cons Libs Cons Libs Cons Libs Cons Libs Cons 
N 456 511 86 104 100 94 84 117 103 95 83 101 
Age: mean, 
sd 43, 16 45, 17 43, 17 43, 15 43, 15 48, 18 43, 18 44, 16 41, 17 47, 17 43, 17 46, 17 
Income: 
under 75,000 58% 57% 53% 63% 56% 55% 63% 60% 57% 53% 60% 53% 




41% 48% 47% 40% 37% 49% 34% 54% 47% 46% 40% 50% 
White/Cauca







68% 68% 70% 64% 64% 68% 63% 62% 70% 76% 75% 70% 
 
 
Emotions Experiment: by Ideology 
 Full Sample Control Anger Disgust Sad Happy 
 Libs Cons Libs Cons Libs Cons Libs Cons Libs Cons Libs Cons 
N 706 485 149 94 135 97 141 89 128 100 152 104 
Age: under 44  75% 71% 73% 72% 73% 76% 76% 64% 74% 73% 79% 70% 
Income: under 
75,000 70% 61% 64% 59% 74% 59% 70% 61% 78% 66% 63% 63% 
Women 60% 55% 56% 56% 65% 56% 59% 54% 60% 64% 59% 44% 
Education: some 
college, no degree 41% 43% 37% 37% 44% 42% 40% 47% 41% 53% 42% 37% 









Appendix B: Sensitivity Analyses 
Emotions Experiment 
To test the sensitivity of the models, we can re-run the regressions with certain control 
variables added and subtracted. This tells us whether the sign and p-value associated with the 
IV coefficients is the product of some omitted variable bias, or whether the coefficients are 
sensitive to the inclusion of other variables in the model. 
First, recall that the scale variable measuring responses on the “hunger” variables did not 
indicate significant effects for the IVs in any of the models, and the scale variable combining 
all of the hunger and refugee questions only indicated weakly significant effects for the 
“anger” variable—and only when certain controls were included. The effects of the “anger” 
variable were likely driven entirely by the 5 “refugee” questions. For those reasons, I report a 
sensitivity analysis of the scale variable compiled by the 5 refugee questions in the emotions 
experiment. Table 1 displays the results below.
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1: Emotions Experiment: Scale of Refugee Questions 
 (Model 1) ( Model 2) ( Model 3) ( Model 4) ( Model 5) ( Model 6) ( Model 7) ( Model 8) ( Model 9) ( Model 10) 
VARIABLES SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE 
Constant 4.463*** 4.953*** 5.212*** 4.958*** 5.067*** 5.200*** 5.574*** 5.184*** 5.414*** 6.129*** 
 (0.100) (0.141) (0.167) (0.174) (0.201) (0.207) (0.189) (0.227) (0.300) (0.306) 
Anger 0.299** 0.279* 0.274* 0.264* 0.261* 0.266* 0.310** 0.320** 0.321** 0.265** 
 (0.144) (0.142) (0.144) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.127) 
Disgust 0.120 0.124 0.124 0.144 0.141 0.140 0.120 0.132 0.131 0.0840 
 (0.144) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.130) (0.129) (0.129) (0.126) 
Sadness 0.159 0.139 0.116 0.110 0.107 0.117 0.229* 0.244* 0.242* 0.207 
 (0.145) (0.143) (0.145) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.127) 
Happiness 0.00688 -0.0159 0.00451 0.0279 0.0307 0.0306 0.0493 0.0613 0.0604 0.00495 
 (0.141) (0.140) (0.141) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.123) 
Age  -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.175*** -0.171*** -0.157*** -0.118*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.135*** 
  (0.0349) (0.0351) (0.0350) (0.0352) (0.0357) (0.0324) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0317) 
Income   -0.0626*** -0.0573*** -0.0560*** -0.0477** -0.00790 -0.0242 -0.0260 -0.0186 
   (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0184) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0187) 
Women    0.416*** 0.413*** 0.424*** 0.348*** 0.369*** 0.373*** 0.405*** 
    (0.0918) (0.0919) (0.0922) (0.0833) (0.0833) (0.0834) (0.0814) 
Knowledge     -0.145 -0.128 -0.250** -0.263** -0.253** -0.315*** 
     (0.132) (0.133) (0.121) (0.120) (0.121) (0.118) 
White      -0.299*** -0.148 -0.142 -0.00667 -0.0638 
      (0.108) (0.0985) (0.0982) (0.152) (0.148) 
Conservative       -1.537*** -1.513*** -1.512*** -1.401*** 
       (0.0846) (0.0847) (0.0846) (0.0837) 
Education        0.105*** 0.104*** 0.0865** 
        (0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0336) 
Party ID         -0.0734 -0.0510 
         (0.0624) (0.0609) 
Pol. Self-Image          -0.207*** 
          (0.0265) 
           
Observations 1,240 1,238 1,221 1,217 1,217 1,206 1,161 1,161 1,161 1,161 
R-squared 0.005 0.023 0.031 0.047 0.048 0.053 0.264 0.270 0.271 0.308 
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Table 1: Emotions Experiment: Scale of 
Refugee Questions, Continued 
 (Model 11) (Model 12) 
VARIABLES SCALE SCALE 
   
Constant 5.838*** 5.227*** 
 (0.233) (0.272) 
Anger 0.266** 0.290** 
 (0.125) (0.145) 
Disgust 0.0856 0.116 
 (0.125) (0.145) 
Sadness 0.212* 0.150 
 (0.125) (0.146) 
Happiness -0.000149 0.0287 
 (0.121) (0.142) 
Age -0.142***  
 (0.0309)  
Women 0.405***  
 (0.0804)  
Knowledge -0.323***  
 (0.115)  
Conservative -1.434***  
 (0.0817)  
Education 0.0771**  
 (0.0320)  
Pol Self-Image -0.204***  
 (0.0260)  
Income  -0.0538*** 
  (0.0205) 
White  -0.190 
  (0.165) 
Party ID  -0.0887 
  (0.0684) 
   
Observations 1,186 1,210 
R-squared 0.305 0.021 
Standard errors in parentheses 




In Models 11 of Table 1, I include only those variables found to have consistently significant 
effects on the IVs. In Model 12, I include only those variables found to have consistently 
insignificant effects. For example, the significant effects of income and white self-
identification drop out when ideology is added to the model. Taken together, the various 
combinations of control variables have relatively marginal effects on the coefficient for 
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Anger (significant in all models). Anger has a positive effect on support for the rights of 
refugees ranging from 0.299-0.261, an average coefficient of 0.276. When political ideology 
is included as a control variable, the Anger coefficient ranges from 0.266-0.321, with an 
average of 0.296. Ultimately, the analysis allows us to conclude that, while certain control 
variables are included for theoretical reasons discussed in the body of the manuscript, the 
models do not appear to be particularly sensitive to any combination or inclusion/exclusion 
of control variables. 
Bias Experiment 
The bias experiment was conducted on the Qualtrics qBus platform, so a larger number of 
potential control variables were possible for inclusion in the models. In Table 2 below, I 
report the results of a fuller analysis of the experimental treatments as they relate to the scale 
of the 5 hunger-related dependent variables. 
Table 2: Bias Experiment: Scale of Hunger Questions 
 (Model 13) (Model 14) (Model 15) (Model 16) (Model 17) (Model 18) 
VARIABLES SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE 
       
Constant 5.971*** 5.878*** 5.791*** 5.780*** 5.804*** 5.797*** 
 (0.136) (0.150) (0.160) (0.175) (0.175) (0.176) 
Pos, Gain 0.173 0.172 0.168 0.168 0.167 0.167 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
Pos, Loss 0.125 0.126 0.126 0.127 0.122 0.125 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
Neg, Gain 0.387*** 0.386*** 0.389*** 0.390*** 0.400*** 0.399*** 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
Neg, Loss 0.183 0.182 0.183 0.183 0.191 0.190 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) 
Age -0.0193*** -0.0200*** -0.0201*** -0.0201*** -0.0191*** -0.0188*** 
 (0.00238) (0.00243) (0.00243) (0.00246) (0.00252) (0.00259) 
Income  0.0407 0.0141 0.0141 0.0185 0.0251 
  (0.0274) (0.0323) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0344) 
Education   0.0442 0.0447 0.0501* 0.0507* 
   (0.0285) (0.0287) (0.0289) (0.0289) 
Women    0.0126 0.00779 0.0144 
    (0.0806) (0.0806) (0.0815) 
Knowledge     -0.150* -0.145 
     (0.0895) (0.0900) 
White      -0.0566 
      (0.0977) 
       
Observations 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 
R-squared 0.067 0.069 0.072 0.072 0.074 0.074 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2: Bias Experiment: Scale of Hunger Questions, Continued 
 (Model 19) (Model 20) (Model 21) (Model 22) (Model 23) (Model 24) (Model 25) (Model 26) 
VARIABLES SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE SCALE 
Constant 6.200*** 6.641*** 6.709*** 6.585*** 6.358*** 6.419*** 6.591*** 4.670*** 
 (0.181) (0.225) (0.228) (0.245) (0.301) (0.325) (0.217) (0.220) 
Pos, Gain 0.125 0.119 0.127 0.117 0.124 0.125 0.117 0.170 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.128) 
Pos, Loss 0.164 0.139 0.134 0.126 0.129 0.127 0.126 0.152 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.122) (0.127) 
Neg, Gain 0.361*** 0.338*** 0.341*** 0.337*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.338*** 0.388*** 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.128) 
Neg, Loss 0.182 0.179 0.171 0.166 0.172 0.170 0.166 0.190 
 (0.126) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.129) 
Age -0.0169*** -0.0169*** -0.0146*** -0.0137*** -0.0123*** -0.0124*** -0.0134***  
 (0.00258) (0.00257) (0.00288) (0.00295) (0.00313) (0.00314) (0.00273)  
Income 0.0342 0.0231 0.0137 0.00939 0.0186 0.0191  0.0429 
 (0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0342) (0.0343) (0.0350) (0.0351)  (0.0361) 
Education 0.0128 0.00857 -0.000681 -0.00191 0.000735 8.34e-05  0.0516* 
 (0.0288) (0.0286) (0.0291) (0.0291) (0.0291) (0.0292)  (0.0295) 
Women -0.0414 -0.0263 -0.00840 -0.0204 -0.0181 -0.0163  0.122 
 (0.0811) (0.0809) (0.0814) (0.0818) (0.0818) (0.0819)  (0.0821) 
Knowledge -0.160* -0.215** -0.216** -0.197** -0.195** -0.193** -0.194**  
 (0.0897) (0.0909) (0.0908) (0.0918) (0.0918) (0.0919) (0.0901)  
White 0.00406 -0.00344 -0.00149 -0.00278 0.0118 0.00727  -0.195** 
 (0.0984) (0.0980) (0.0979) (0.0978) (0.0984) (0.0989)  (0.0985) 
Conservative -0.608*** -0.657*** -0.660*** -0.664*** -0.659*** -0.657*** -0.664***  
 (0.0796) (0.0807) (0.0806) (0.0806) (0.0807) (0.0808) (0.0796)  
Party ID  -0.156*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.151*** -0.152*** -0.152***  
  (0.0480) (0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0475)  
Employed   -0.0506* -0.0476* -0.0471 -0.0475* -0.0505*  
   (0.0286) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0268)  
Children    0.0537 0.0675* 0.0668* 0.0539  
    (0.0391) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0384)  
Married     0.0314 0.0305  0.0880*** 
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     (0.0240) (0.0241)  (0.0228) 
Region      -0.0173  -0.0222 
      (0.0352)  (0.0364) 
         
Observations 967 967 967 967 967 967 967 1,039 
R-squared 0.126 0.135 0.138 0.140 0.141 0.141 0.140 0.033 
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Table 2 reveals a similar pattern to what was observed in Table 1, where no combination or 
omission/exclusion of any control variable had an effect on the significance level or any 
major effect on the substantive size of the coefficient for the Negative Image, Approach-
Gain message. Across all of the models in Table 2, the effect for the Negative-gains message 
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